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INTRODUCTION
We interpret the legislatively enacted Federal Rules of
Evidence as we would any statute.'
We live in an "age of statutes."2 Consequently, when a court
encounters a body of rules resulting from a process that conclud-
ed with legislation, the court may find it hard to resist the con-
clusion that the rules are subject to the principles used to inter-
pret statutes. The Supreme Court of the United States is no ex-
ception. Describing the Federal Rules of Evidence ("Federal
Rules" or "Rules") as a "legislative enactment,"' the United
States Supreme Court has stated that a court should use "tradi-
tional tools of statutory construction" in interpreting the Federal
Rules.4 With minor variation, the same analysis appears in vir-
tually every case rendered by the Supreme Court interpreting
the Federal Rules of Evidence.5 Although the Supreme Court
1. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993) (emphasis
added).
2. GuIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982).
8. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 163 (1988).
4. Id. (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987)).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 209 (1995) (disagreeing
with the argument that with Rule 410 "Congress intended to prevent criminal defen-
dante from offering to waive the plea-statement Rules during plea negotiation");
Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160 (1995) (noting that the Advisory Commit-
tee draft was "particularly relevant in determining the meaning of the document
Congress enacted'" (quoting Beech Aircraft, 488 U.S. at 165-66 n.9)); Williamson v.
United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600 (1994) (concluding that the ambiguous language of
Rule 804(b)(3) did not mean that Congress endorsed a view "so inconsistent with the
Rule's underlying theory"); Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587 ("We interpret the . . . Federal
Rules of Evidence as we would any statute."); United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S.
317, 322 (1992) (relying on the plain meaning of "testimony" to conclude that Rule
804(b)(1) "applies only to sworn statements"); United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554,
566 (1989) (relying on the "plain language" of Rule 104(a) to reject an "inconsistent"
interpretation); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 508 (1989) ("Our
task in deciding this case... is... to identify the rule that Congress fash-
ioned . . . ."); Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 688 (1988) ("Congress was
not nearly so concerned with the potential prejudicial effect of Rule 404(b) . . .");
Bouijaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 178 (1987) (concluding that under Rule 104
"Congress has decided that courts may consider hearsay in making these factual
determinations"); Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 125 (1987) ("T]he legisla-
tive history demonstrates with uncommon clarity that Congress specifically under-
stood, considered, and rejected a version of Rule 606(b) ... ."); United States v.
Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 49 (1984) (noting that although the Court promulgates the Feder-
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has not metaphorically joined the terms "tool" and "construction"
in every pertinent case, it has been consistent in treating the
text of the Rules as the text of a statute.6 As a result, the Su-
preme Court has interpreted the Federal Rules of Evidence with
principles drawn from the extensive and elusive body of law
applicable to statutory construction. Despite the Court's consis-
tency in commencing with the premise that the Federal Rules of
Evidence are a statute, evidence scholars have noted a remark-
able inconsistency in the way in which the Court actually inter-
prets the Federal Rules of Evidence.7 Indeed, the Supreme Court
al Rules of Evidence, "we are in truth merely a conduit"); United States v. Gillock,
445 U.S. 360, 367 (1980) ("The language and legislative history of Rule 501 give no
aid to Gillock.").
6: See Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 201 ("[Albsent some affirmative indication of Con-
gress' intent to preclude waiver, we have presumed that statutory provisions are
subject to waiver by voluntary agreement of the parties."); Salerno, 505 U.S. at 322
("To respect [Congress's] determination, we must enforce the words that it enacted");
Green, 490 U.S. at 524 ("A general statutory rule usually does not govern unless
there is no more specific rule. Rule 403, the more general provision, thus comes into
play only if Rule 609, though specific regarding criminal defendants, does not per-
tain to civil witnesses." (citation omitted)).
7. See Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After
Sixteen Years-The Effect of 'Plain Meaning" Jurisprudence, the Need for an Adviso-
ry Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the
Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857, 864-66 (1992) (concluding that although the Su-
preme Court has used a plain meaning interpretation, it is not the sole method of
interpretation); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Moving Beyond "Top Down" Grand Theories
of Statutory Construction: A "Bottom Up" Interpretive Approach to the Federal Rules
of Evidence, 75 OR. L. REV. 389, 395-96 (1996) (criticizing the Court's apparent shift
from textualism in recent cases); Randolph N. Jonakait, Text, Texts, or Ad Hoc De-
terminations: Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 71 IND. L.J. 551, 552
(1996) (concluding that although the Court claims to be using the plain meaning
standard, it actually uses other methods of interpreting the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence); Eileen A. Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning, and the Law of Ev-
idence, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1717, 1759 (1995) [hereinafter Scallen, Classical Rhetoric]
("The Court consistently has held that only a 'plain meaning,' textualist approach to
interpretation is appropriate for evidentiary rules."); Eileen A. Scallen, Interpreting
the Federal Rules of Evidence: The Use and Abuse of the Advisory Committee Notes,
28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1283, 1291-93 (1995) [hereinafter Scallen, Use and Abuse] (ad-
vocating the increased use of the Advisory Committee Notes in the interpretation of
the Federal Rules of Evidence); Andrew E. Taslitz, Daubert's Guide to the Federal
Rules of Evidence: A Not-So-Plain-Meaning Jurisprudence, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 3, 7
(1995) [hereinafter Taslitz, Daubertfs Guide] ("[The Court has not engaged in the
kind of pure plain-meaning approach that recent scholarship has suggested."); An-
drew E. Taslitz, Interpretive Method and the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Call for a
Politically Realistic Hermeneutics, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 329, 399 (1995) [hereinafter
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has failed to advance a manageable set of guiding interpreta-
tional principles for the Federal Rules of Evidence despite nu-
merous efforts at construction.' The Court's difficulty in articu-
lating a coherent hermeneutic for construing the Federal Rules
of Evidence may be traceable to the inherent incompatibility of
the text of the Rules and customary principles of statutory con-
struction.9
When the United States Supreme Court claims that the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence must be interpreted by use of the "tradi-
tional tools of statutory construction," its statement is likely to
be treated as inviolable.1" Taking the Supreme Court's "tool"
metaphor seriously has led many evidence scholars to the ineluc-
table next step of sorting through and selecting which "tools" of
statutory construction should apply." This exercise inevitably
results in an examination of the various schools of thought re-
garding the construction of statutes, extracting the most attrac-
tive or pertinent features from those schools, and then forging a
unique theory for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Taslitz, Politically Realistic Hermeneutics] (concluding that the Court is now using a
"politically realistic hermeneutic" approach to the interpretation of the Federal Rules
of Evidence).
8. See Becker & Orenstein, supra note 7, at 863 ("Bourjaily presents a serious
problem in the interpretation of -the Rules of Evidence and demonstrates the poten-
tial mischief that can result from a rigid plain meaning analysis of the Rules.");
Jonakait, supra note 7, at 552 ("Whatever the cause the Supreme Court's decisions
interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence certainly have not been satisfying.").
9. See infra text accompanying notes 25-34. Of course, the Supreme Court's lack
of consistency also may be traceable in part to the fact that law surrounding the in-
terpretation of statutes is a moving target at best. See, e.g., Imwinkelried, supra
note 7, at 396-407 (discussing various methods of statutory interpretation).
10. See, e.g., Imwinkelried, supra note 7, at 393; Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, supra
note 7, at 1718-20; Eileen A. Scallen & Andrew -E. Taslitz, Reading the Federal
Rules of Evidence Realistically: A Response to Professor Imwinkelried, 75 OR. L. REV.
429, 429-30 (1996); Taslitz, Politically Realistic Hermeneutics, supra note 7, at 355.
11. See Imwinkelried, supra note 7, at 412-27 (arguing that political and linguistic
considerations require giving significant relative weight to the text of the Rules);
Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, supra note 7, at 1741-59 (evaluating the intentionalism,
purposivism, textualism, and practical reasoning models of statutory construction);
Scallen & Taslitz, supra note 10, at 435-42 (defending practical reasoning and politi-
cally realistic hermeneutics); Taslitz, Politically Realistic Hermeneutics, supra note 7,
at 353401 (criticizing the plain meaning model of statutory construction and advo-
cating the adoption of politically realistic hermeneutics).
EVIDENCE MYOPIA
Participants in the recent scholarly debate concerning the in-
terpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence are evidence pro-
fessors who appear to have an irresistible compulsion to revisit
the issue.' Although several scholars have published more than
one article on the subject, the most recent and most orchestrated
synthesis of earlier scholarship on the interpretation of the Fed-
eral Rules is the product of Professors imwinkelried, Scallen,
and Taslitz, each of whom is a major participant in the debate
focusing on the proper interpretational approach to construing
the Rules.13 In what might be described as a debate struggling to
find a conflict, Professors Imwinkelried, Scallen, and Taslitz
have each advocated an interpretive scheme that draws upon
established theories for construing statutes. In his latest contri-
bution to the debate, Professor Imwinkelried summarily cites
five schools of thought that he derived from literature applicable
to statutory construction: plain meaning, legal process,
textualism, practical reasoning, and politically realistic herme-
neutics.'4 Sifting through common ground and seeking to find
harmony with Professors Scallen and Taslitz, Professor
Imwinkelried has endeavored to embrace certain aspects of the
practical reasoning model endorsed by Professor Scallen as well
as certain elements of the politically-realistic hermeneutics
model supported by Professor Taslitz."5 Professor Imwinkelried
12. See supra note 7.
13. See Imwinkelried, supra note 7, at 412-27 (suggesting a "bottom up" approach);
Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, supra note 7, at 1747-59 (advocating practical reasoning);
Scallen & Taslitz, supra note 10, at 435-42 (advocating practical reasoning and polit-
ically realistic hermeneutics); Taslitz, Politically Realistic Hermeneutics, supra note 7,
at 353-54, 377-401 (arguing for politically realistic hermeneutics).
14. See Imwinkelried, supra note 7, at 396-407.
15. See id at 410-12, 421-23. Like Professors Scallen and Taslitz, Professor
Imwinkelried concludes that no one interpretive approach should govern all statutes.
See idU at 410-12. Thus, similar to the arguments advanced by Professors Scallen
and Taslitz, Professor Imwinkelried argues that the Court should devise an inter-
pretive approach specifically tailored to the statutory scheme of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. See id. Moreover, Professor Imwinkelried agrees with Professor Scallen's
view that evidence decisions be made quickly at trial and that, consequently, courts
should attach great relative weight to the text of the Rules. See id. at 421. In addi-
tion, in an approach similar to the interpretive model advanced by Professor Taslitz,
Professor Imwinkelried treats the issue of interpretation from the perspective of her-
meneutics. See id. Professor Imwinkelried also concurs with Professor Taslitz's notion
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nevertheless ultimately concludes that "Professors Scallen and
Taslitz undervalue the importance of the text of the Federal
Rules."'6 In response, Professors Scallen and Taslitz express
"frustration" with Professor Imwinkelried's position and argue
that his conclusion that the text of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence deserves primary importance simply begs the question.'7
Their inquiry, rather, is to find guidance in principles pertaining
to statutory construction when the text fails to supply an an-
swer.
18
Distilled to its essence, this recent exchange on the interpreta-
tion of the Federal Rules of Evidence among Professors Scallen,
Taslitz, and Imwinkelried appears to focus on the appropriate
balance between text and extrinsic sources in interpreting a par-
ticular statute. 9 Although interesting, this debate, like most
that "[mieaning emerges from an interplay between the writer's text and the read-
er." Id. As a result, Professor Imwinkelried agrees that the choice of interpretive
community is one of the keys to determining the meaning of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. See id. at 421-23.
16. Id. at 426.
17. See Scallen & Taslitz, supra note 10, at 442.
18. See id. at 441-42.
19. Unlike Professors Scallen and Taslitz, Professor Imwinkelried argues that the
text of the Rules is entitled to far more relative weight than extrinsic materials. See
Imwinkelried, supra note 7, at 412. Examining the nature of the Rules, he con-
cludes:
Text deserves little relative weight when it is clear that the drafter chose
the language hurriedly, but here the statutory writers took almost two
years to carefully select the language. Likewise, text warrants less weight
when the reader is unlikely to read the text and rely on its language.
However, here the intended readers, trial judges and attorneys, are atten-
tive to text; in the heat of battle at trial, they rely on text-and little or
nothing else. Similarly, text can justifiably be depreciated when the stat-
ute writers' linguistic conventions differ from those of the readers, or the
writers target multiple groups of readers with varying conventions. How-
ever, as Tome illustrates, in construing the Federal Rules of Evidence,
the courts should typically assume that Congress contemplates the use of
the legal community's conventions.
Id. at 426. Contrary to Professor Imwinkelried's position, Professors Scallen and
Taslitz argue that the Rules should be interpreted in light of all sources of meaning.
While careful consideration of rules passed by Congress suggests that the
text deserves the greatest relative weight when it is clear, where there is
any ambiguity, other indicators of intent, such as legislative history, must
be examined precisely to show appropriate deference to legislative author-
ity; even in the "clear" cases, it is important to examine all sources to
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other treatments of the subject, faces a fate of unsatisfactory
conclusions from the start because it proceeds from the wrong-
minded premise that the Federal Rules of Evidence are a stat-
ute.2" Professors Imwinkelried, Taslitz, and Scallen each un-
questioningly embrace the premise established for them by the
Supreme Court, and each is led into a maze of literature on the
interpretation of statutes.2'
Admittedly, one must disavow hierarchical thinking and chal-
lenge pronouncements by the United States Supreme Court in
order to approach the subject of the interpretation of the Federal
Rules of Evidence from a more defensible intellectual point of
departure. As this Article seeks to demonstrate, however, some
iconoclasm may well foster a better way of thinking about a
body of evidence rules. Ultimately, the purpose of this Article is
to challenge the Rules-as-statute premise on historical and poli-
cy bases, and then to redirect the discussion in a more construc-
tive fashion. In challenging the Rules-as-statute premise, this
Article first examines the consequences of treating the Federal
Rules of Evidence as a statute, canvassing the existing scholarly
debate on the issue. It then turns to the historical and analytical
reasons for concluding that the Federal Rules of Evidence pos-
sess a unique identity that is distinct from that of a typical
ensure that "plain" meaning does not contravene legislative will, a defer-
ential approach expressly endorsed by the Supreme Court.
Scallen & Taslitz, supra note 10, at 440 (citing Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co.,
490 U.S. 504, 509-11 (1989)).
20. See Leslie A. Lunney, Protecting Juries From Themselves: Restricting the Ad-
mission of Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Cases, 48 SMU L. REV. 103, 115-18 (1994)
(providing another example of an argument based on the premise that the Federal
Rules of Evidence are a statute).
21. See, e.g., Imwinkelried, supra note 7, at 392, 407-09; Scallen & Taslitz, supra
note 10, at 438 n.51; Taslitz, Politically Realistic Hermeneutics, supra note 7, at 384
n.273. The maze of literature to which these authors turn includes such works as:
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1111-380 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip N.
Frickey eds., 1994); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory
Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL 59 (1988); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The
New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990);
and Richard A. Posner, Legislation and Its Interpretation: A Primer, 68 NEB. L. REV.
431 (1989).
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statute. This Article then focuses on the developmental history
of the Federal Rules of Evidence and examines this creation of
the Rules as a process of codifying the common law. The remain-
der of the Article seeks to illuminate the hermeneutical conse-
quences of treating the Federal Rules of Evidence as a codifica-
tion of the common law.
I. ARE THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE A STATUTE?
FRAMING THE DEBATE
The issue of whether the Federal Rules of Evidence are a typi-
cal statute to be construed with the "traditional tools of statuto-
ry construction" is not new to this author.22 Admittedly, some
may have difficulty embracing my earlier challenges to the no-
tion that the Federal Rules of Evidence should be construed
with principles applicable to statutory interpretation because of
one indisputable historical fact: The Federal Rules of Evidence
were brought into existence through a process that concluded
with legislation.23 Consequently, in an age of statutes, one may
find it somewhat counterintuitive to conclude that principles of
statutory interpretation should not apply to the Federal Rules of
Evidence.24
22. See Glen Weissenberger, Are the Federal Rules of Evidence a Statute?, 55 OHIO
ST. L.J. 393 (1994) [hereinafter Weissenberger, Are the Rules a Statute?]; Glen
Weissenberger, The Supreme Court and the Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Ev-
idence, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1307 (1992) [hereinafter Weissenberger, Interpretation of the
Rules].
23. The House of Representatives held hearings on the Rules on January 30, 1974
and passed its version of H.R. 5463 on February 6, 1974. See 120 CONG. REC. 2366-
94 (1974). After hearings on November 21, 1974, the Senate passed an amended
version of H.R. 5463 on November 22, 1974. See 120 CONG. REC. 37084-85 (1974). A
Conference Committee produced the final version of H.R. 5463, and both Houses
agreed to it on December 16-18, 1974. See 120 CONG. REC. 40069-70 (1974); 120
CONG. REc. 40890-97 (1974). Finally, the President signed the Rules on January 3,
1975. See Gerald R. Ford, Statement on Signing a Bill Establishing Rules of Evi-
dence in Federal Court Proceedings, 1 PUB. PAPERS 6, 6 (Jan. 3, 1975). For further
discussion on the enactment of the Rules, see Weissenberger, Interpretation of the
Rules, supra note 22, at 1319-24.
24. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Brief Defense of the Supreme Court's Approach
to the Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 27 IND. L. REV. 267, 267
(1993) ("[Sltatutes have now become the dominant source of American law. This
trend is certainly evident in the field of evidence law." (footnote omitted)); Scallen,
1546
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In earlier work on this subject, I advanced several arguments
that sought to demonstrate that the Federal Rules of Evidence
should not be subject to the principles of statutory construc-
tion.25 For the sake of completeness, I will restate briefly those
arguments here. First, the Federal Rules of Evidence were de-
veloped by a multi-branch process in which the dominant partic-
ipant was the judicial branch.26 Congress's role in regard to most
of the Rules was primarily to review and ratify the product of a
coordinate branch of government.2 1 Consequently, under a sepa-
ration of powers theory, the principle of legislative supremacy
does not comport with the unique process that produced the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence.2 ' This argument is supported by the rec-
ognition that statutes typically involve broader subjects than the
Federal Rules of Evidence and have audiences beyond judges
and lawyers. 29 Moreover, statutes typically originate in Con-
gress3 0 and are not designed by a distinct coordinate branch of
government to operate internally within that distinct branch. 1
Classical Rhetoric, supra note 7, at 1741 ("The rules of evidence are indeed stat-
utes . . . ."); Taslitz, Daubert's Guide, supra note 7, at 31-32 ("[Ihe Rules are a
statute of a special kind .... ").
25. See Weissenberger, Are the Rules a Statute?, supra note 22, at 397-400, 402;
Weissenberger, Interpretation of the Rules, supra note 22, at 1307-11, 1319-38.
26. See Weissenberger, Interpretation of the Rules, supra note 22, at 1319-21.
27. See id. at 1323.
28. See id. at 1323-24; cf Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court's Role in In-
terpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1093 (1993)
("Congress has explicitly delegated to the Court rulemaking power, and it is not in-
consistent to imply the Court has greater power to interpret Rules than it does to
interpret statutes.").
29. On the other hand, generally only lawyers and judges read the Federal Rules
of Evidence. See Edward W. Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rule of Evi-
dence, 57 NEB. L. REV. 908, 910 (1978); Imwinkelried, supra note 7, at 423; Taslitz,
Politically Realistic Hermeneutics, supra note 7, at 364.
30. See, e.g., WILLIAM P. STATSKY, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS: How TO USE STATUTES AND
REGULATIONS 1 (1975) ("The legislature is a branch of government which has primary
responsibility for creating or enacting laws."); Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive
Branch and International Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1253 (1988) ("Statutes may
and usually do originate in the Congress . . . ").
31. See, e.g., 1 NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 1.06 (5th
ed. 1994) ("The legislative function involves the creation of 'general rules' which usu-
ally affect the entire population or a 'general class' of the population . . . ."); WIL-
LIAM P. STATSKY, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS AND DRAFTING 7-8 (2d ed. 1984) ("Most enacted
law is written to solve broad problems in society, e.g., pollution control, revenue col-
lection, traffic congestion, crime detection."); Moore, supra note 28, at 1093 ("The
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In addition, the nature of Congress's participation in the adop-
tion of the Federal Rules of Evidence belies the notion that co-
herent conceptions of legislative intent stand behind the text of
the Rules. Congress's role in the rulemaking process differs sub-
stantially from its traditional role in enacting statutes and, con-
sequently, the passive enactment of Rules drafted largely by the
judicial branch does not comport with any realistic conception of
a legislature's typical function in creating statutes.2 In the con-
text of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this reality has long
been recognized. In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Doug-
las, Black, and Murphy, Justice Frankfurter made the following,
essentially indisputable, observation about the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure:
Plainly the Rules are not acts of Congress and can not be
treated as such. Having due regard to the mechanics of legis-
lation and the practical conditions surrounding the business
of Congress when the Rules were submitted, to draw any in-
ference of tacit approval from non-action by Congress is to
appeal to unreality."
On a substantive level, this multi-faceted argument suggests
that the principle of separation of powers, which supports judi-
cial deference to the legislative branch, is misplaced in the con-
text of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Consequently, the typical
techniques used to interpret statutes, many of which are derived
from judicial deference to legislative supremacy, do not logically
apply to the Rules.34
A second argument challenging the Rules-as-statute premise
focuses on the unique attributes of federal courts.35 Federal
judiciary plays no role in statutory promulgation ... .Although the Court's actual
role in the rulemaking process is relatively minimal, nonetheless the Court must at
least approve the proposed Rules before they are transmitted to Congress.").
32. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
33. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 18 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35).
34. See Weissenberger, Interpretation of the Rules, supra note 22, at 1323; cf.
Moore, supra note 28, at 1040 (advocating a more activist role for the Court in the
interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure than is taken in the interpre-
tation of statutes).
35. See Weissenberger, Interpretation of the Rules, supra note 22, at 1332-38.
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courts have certain inherent powers that were not and could not
have been legislatively eliminated by virtue of the adoption of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. 6 Inherent powers give courts
substantial latitude in their actions under the Rules,"7 a latitude
typically not enjoyed by entities subject to the mandates of stat-
utes.8 Consequently, if the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence were intended to alter radically the authority of federal
courts, one would expect to see this change made very express in
the text of the Rules. 9 In one of the few recent Supreme Court
decisions on the subject of inherent judicial powers, the Supreme
Court held that the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure did not displace the inherent powers of the judiciary.40 This
authority minimally suggests that inherent judicial powers are
36. See id.
37. See idL at 1333-34; see also, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46
(1991) (noting that the inherent power of a court can be invoked even if procedural
rules and statutes sanction the same conduct); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447
U.S. 752, 765 (1980) (concluding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) does not
limit a court's power to dismiss for failure to prosecute); Link v. Wabash R.R., 370
U.S. 626, 630 (1962) (ruling that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) does not ab-
rogate the power of the courts); Primus Automotive Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Batarse, 115
F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding that sanctionable conduct fell outside the
scope of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, but within the
courts inherent powers); Glatter v. Mroz, 65 F.3d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1995) (not-
ing that a rule "promulgated by Congress does not displace a court's inherent power
to impose sanctions for a parties' [sic] bad faith conduct"); Philippines v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 74-75 (3d Cir. 1994) (concluding that courts do not
need to exhaust all other sanctioning mechanisms before resorting to their inherent
powers).
38. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 107 (1984)
(finding that a Pennsylvania statute concerning the institutionalization of the retard-
ed did not give petitioners any discretion to disregard their duties); Mackey v.
Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 5 (1979) (reading the Massachusetts Implied Consent Law to
leave a police officer no discretion once a breath-analysis test had been refused); Ad-
ams v. Nagle, 303 U.S. 532, 542 (1938) (stating that when a statute vests no discre-
tion in an executive officer, a court must compel him to act or to refrain from acting
in accordance with the statute if he disregards the statutory mandate); see also Don
LeDuc, Michigan Administrative Law: Abridged Edition-A Michigan Administrative
Law Primer, 12 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 21, 27 (1995) ("Agencies have no inherent pow-
er and must obtain power from the legislature through statutes . . ").
39. See Weissenberger, Interpretation of the Rules, supra note 22, at 1333.
40. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50 (affirming the use of inherent powers to impose
sanctions not otherwise stipulated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 or in 28
U.S.C. § 1927). For further discussion regarding Chambers, see Weissenberger, Inter-
pretation of the Rules, supra note 22, at 1333-34.
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incompatible with the proposition that the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence embody statutory mandates of the variety more typically
found in legislation governing society in general.41 Admittedly,
the full extent of indefeasible inherent judicial powers has not
been defined clearly.42 It nevertheless is clear that whatever
power Congress might have to enact legislation that affects the
internal operation of federal courts,43 Congress's rulemaking
authority would at some point collide with inherent judicial pre-
rogatives were Congress to encroach upon the judiciary's funda-
mental Article III powers.4' Although not deductively conclusive,
this argument strongly suggests that any radical alteration of
the judiciary's range of choices in applying evidentiary doctrines
was extremely unlikely.
Finally, Federal Rule of Evidence 102 serves as the basis for a
third analytic argument supporting the conclusion that the
Rules should not be construed as a typical statute.45 Rule 102 is
41. See Weissenberger, Interpretation of the Rules, supra note 22, at 1336-38.
42. See, e.g., Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 481 U.S. 787,
819-20 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that inherent powers
are only those "necessary to permit the courts to function"); Roadway Express, Inc.
v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980) ("The inherent powers of federal courts are those
which 'are necessary to the exercise of all others." (quoting United States v. Hud-
son, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812))); United States v. Rojas, 53 F.3d 1212, 1214
(11th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he exact scope of this 'inherent judicial power' is uncertain.");
In re Stone, 986 F.2d 898, 902 (5th Cir. 1993) ("[Inherent] powers are those deemed
necessary to protect the efficient and orderly administration of justice and those nec-
essary to command respect for the court's orders, judgments, procedures, and author-
ity."); Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 1985) ("[Tlhe notion
of inherent power has been described as nebulous, and its bounds as 'shadowy.'"
(footnote omitted)).
43. See Weissenberger, Interpretation of the Rules, supra note 22, at 1320-21 (dis-
cussing congressional modification of specific Federal Rules).
44. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992) ("The Consti-
tution's division of power among the three branches is violated where one branch
invades the territory of another .... ."); Michaelson v. United States, ex rel. Chicago,
St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. Co., 266 U.S.' 42, 64 (1924) (affiring that the
Constitution vests courts with powers unalterable by legislation); Stone, 986 F.2d at
901 (explaining that any legislation purporting to interfere with the court's inherent
powers under Article III would be an unconstitutional violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers); Martin-Trigona v. Lavien, 737 F.2d 1254, 1261 (2d Cir. 1984)
(stating that courts have a constitutional obligation to protect themselves from legis-
lation that "impairs their ability to carry out Article III functions").
45. See Weissenberger, Are the Rules a Statute?, supra note 22, at 397-98, 402.
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a simple, if not eloquent, rule that addresses the issue of the
construction of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Amazingly, this
rule has been overlooked, if not purposefully ignored, by those
who advocate the use of principles applicable to statutory inter-
pretation in construing the Federal Rules of Evidence.46 The im-
portance of Rule 102 in the interpretation of the Rules is central
because it supplies the interpretive directive by which all other
Rules are to be construed. Rule 102 provides:
These Rules shall be construed to secure fairness in adminis-
tration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and
promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence
to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings
justly determined. 47
As I have stated previously regarding this rule:
Rather than containing any message whatsoever about apply-
ing such statutory interpretation doctrines as "legislative in-
tent" and the preemption of the common law, Rule 102 ar-
ticulates values which have historically been recognized as
guiding and inspiring the application of evidentiary rules.
Most important, Rule 102 does not say: "hold fast, remain
static, and do not expand upon the text of the rules." Rather,
it could not be clearer in its language in contemplating "the
growth and development of the law of evidence" in the con-
struction of the Rules.... I cannot escape an interpretation
of the phrase "growth and development of the law of evi-
dence" as one which authorizes the development of novel evi-
dentiary doctrines. Growth cannot be achieved but through
these evidentiary principles, preserved in case law prece-
dent.48
The convergence of the three preceding arguments strongly sug-
gests that the characterization of the Federal Rules of Evidence
46. See Mark D. Rosen, What Has Happened to the Common Law?-Recent Amer-
ican Codifications, and Their Impact on Judicial Practice and the Law's Subsequent
Development, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1119, 1195 (noting that Professor Imwinkelried's
article, supra note 24, "makes no reference at all to Rule 102"); supra note 7.
47. FED. R. EVID. 102.
48. Weissenberger, Are the Rules a Statute?, supra note 22, at 398 (footnotes omit-
ted).
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as a typical statute is not supported by the nature of federal
courts or the text of the Rules.
Where my earlier articles have sought to explicate analytic
and policy reasons to support the thesis that the Federal Rules
of Evidence should not be interpreted with principles attendant
to statutory interpretation, this Article seeks to substantiate one
additional proposition supported by historical facts: The Federal
Rules of Evidence represent a codification of preexisting common
law and, as such, the Federal Rules have a unique identity that
should inform their interpretation. Moreover, because of the
distinct ethos of the Federal Rules, Rule 102 occupies a special
status in the constellation of evidentiary rules.49 Rule 102, the
only rule in the Federal Rules of Evidence in which "intent" or
"purpose" matters, essentially commands that the text of the
Federal Rules of Evidence not be treated as the text of a stat-
ute. ° Consequently, the Rules should not be approached with
the design of discerning intent or meaning from the text, from
extrinsic sources, or from both.51 As a codification of the common
law, the text of the Federal Rules of Evidence serves a distinct
nonstatutory purpose in articulating an index of the develop-
ment of the law of evidence, which facilitates the continued
growth of evidence law commanded by Rule 102. Although this
approach to interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence may
seem radical in the age of statutes, it gains compelling support
from this country's history of the codification of common law.
52
Before turning to this historical analysis, it is appropriate to
ask: What is at stake in this debate? Does it really matter
whether the Federal Rules of Evidence are construed as a stat-
ute? Will embracing the premise that the Federal Rules of Evi-
49. See infra text accompanying notes 111-19.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 155-61.
51. But see Imwinkelried, supra note 7, at 418-19 (arguing that the legislative his-
tory and historical context of the Rules weighs strongly in favor of attaching great
relative weight to the text of the Rules); Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, supra note 7, at
1748 (advocating examination of all relevant sources, including the text of the Rules,
the intent of the drafters, and the historical context of the Rules); Taslitz, Politically
Realistic Hermeneutics, supra note 7, at 389, 394 (maintaining that the "intent" or
"purpose" of the Rules is often ascertainable from legislative history, the Advisory
Committee Notes, and chamber committee reports).
52. See infra text accompanying notes 120-99.
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dence are a typical statute result in no adverse consequences? In
attempting to answer these questions, commentators have iden-
tified systemic problems in interpreting the Federal Rules of
Evidence as a typical statute.53 For example, one commentator
argues that construing the Federal Rules of Evidence as a typi-
cal statute will inhibit the growth of evidence law.' More specif-
ically, a statutory approach to the Federal Rules of Evidence will
necessarily mean that their interpretation will be inescapably
text-bound.5 5 On one level, a text-bound approach deprives the
Rules of flexibility and adaptability. 56 On a more significant
level, however, a text-bound approach may result in the whole-
sale elimination of a multitude of important pre-Rules common-
law doctrines that are not expressly preserved on the face of the
text of the Rules.5 In regard to this latter point, Professor
Imwinkelried has argued, commencing with the Rules-as-statute
premise, that federal courts of appeals have no authority to en-
graft principles of exclusion on the express text of the Rules.58
According to Professor Imwinkelried, the preexisting common
law has been legislated away, and the express text precludes the
creation of new doctrines that would further delimit admissibility
53. See Becker & Orenstein, supra note 7, at 867-68; Jonakait, supra note 7, at
551-53; Rosen, supra note 46, at 1194-96.
54. See Rosen, supra note 46, at 1196.
55. See Imwinkelried, supra note 7, at 412 ("[I1n a relative sense, the text is enti-
tled to far more weight [than extrinsic materials]."); Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, su-
pra note 7, at 1751 ("[L]ooking to the text first provides some degree of continuity
and stability."); Scallen & Taslitz, supra note 10, at 429 (concluding that they and
Professor Imwinkelried "all agree that the text of a rule deserves the most weight");
Taslitz, Politically Realistic Hermeneutics, supra note 7, at 394 ("[S]tatutory text
deserves special weight.").
56. See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Supreme Court, Plain Meaning, and the
Changed Rules of Evidence, 68 TEX. L. REV. 745, 784-86 (1990).
57. See Imwinkelried, supra note 24, at 271 ("[I1f a common-law exclusionary rule
has not been codified in the text of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Court has
uniformly held that the rule is no longer good law.").
58. See id. at 273-75, 279-81, 289-92. Ultimately, Professor Imwinkelried believes
that empowering appellate courts to formulate general exclusionary evidentiary Rules
would threaten trial court discretion. See id. at 290. Consequently, he sees the limi-
tation on engrafting inadmissibility doctrines on the Rules as desirable. See id. at
294. Preserving trial court discretion is indeed a laudable goal; however, there are
numerous ways of accomplishing that end without depriving the Rules of Evidence of
a flexible and expansive application. For further examination of this specific problem,
see infra notes 183-99 and accompanying text.
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beyond the express language of the Rules themselves. 59 Ulti-
mately, however, treating the Federal Rules of Evidence as a
statute will result in courts abdicating their time-honored role in
crafting the law of evidence. If courts treat the Federal Rules of
Evidence as a statute, they will defer to the legislative branch as
the arbiter of evidentiary policy when confronted with the inevi-
table indeterminacy of the text of the Rules.60 This reversal of
traditional roles flies in the face of historical wisdom, and it is
incongruous with the design of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 61
Consequently, the debate among Professor Imwinkelried, myself,
and several other commentators is not merely academic. It ulti-
mately sheds light on the ability of courts to promote the growth
and development of the Federal Rules of Evidence, as contem-
plated by the express mandate of Rule 102.
This debate also will influence the way in which the positive
aspects of statutes affect the landscape of evidence law, and it
59. See Imwinkelreid, supra note 24, at 273-75. Courts in California have been
reluctant to exercise powers, even inherent powers, when the California legislature
has spoken on the same matter. See People v. Municipal Court, 574 P.2d 425, 427
(Cal. 1978) ("The exercise of a judicial power ...which inheres in courts when the
Legislature is silent must be tempered and restrained when the Legislature has spo-
ken. . . . '[I]nherent powers should never be exercised in such a manner to nullify
existing legislation or frustrate legitimate legislative policy." (quoting Ferguson v.
Keays, 484 P.2d 70, 73 (Cal. 1971)) (emphasis omitted)). Thus, upon the creation of
the California Evidence Code, California courts referred to the Code as the "sole and
authoritative arbiter of all matters which come within its purview." Pitchess v. Supe-
rior Court, 522 P.2d 305, 311 (Cal. 1974). The legislature's resolution of competing
interests, as contained in the Code, is understood as binding on California courts be-
cause the legislature undertook the role of drafting the Evidence Code. See Lemelle
v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. Rptr. 450, 457 (Ct. App. 1978). In this regard, Professor
Imwinkelried has correctly pointed out that California's uncodified exclusionary rules
of evidence were abolished upon the enactment of the California Evidence Code, a
code that bears little resemblance to the Federal Rules of Evidence, both in its
adoption and application. See Imwinkelried, supra note 24, at 277. By attempting to
engraft the experience of California upon the interpretation of the Federal Rules of
Evidence with regard to the rulemaking authority of federal courts, Professor
Imwinkelried fails to appreciate the differences between the California Evidence Code
and the Federal Rules of Evidence. The fact that California is Professor
Imwinkelried's home may help explain his perception of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence.
60. See HART & SACKS, supra note 21, at 413-14; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note
21, at 332; Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103
HARV. L. REV. 405, 426-28 (1989).
61. See infra notes 120-65 and accompanying text.
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will sharpen the analysis of statutes that affect evidentiary is-
sues. Statutes can secure several benefits that are unique to
their identity and origin. They can, for example, clear away pre-
existing law and provide future predictability.62 In addition, stat-
utes can promote evenhanded justice in every context and forum
in which they are applied.6 3 Convincing historical evidence, how-
ever, indicates that the judicial and legislative branches did not
collaborate in the promulgation of a statute in creating the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence.64 Rather, these branches joined to create
a codification of the preexisting common law, which occupies an
extraordinary position in the law.65 As the following sections of
this Article address, such codes have unique attributes that dis-
tinguish them from statutes, both in design and in operation.
62. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 621 (1978) ("[The
Death on the High Seas Act] brought a measure of uniformity and predictability to
the law ... ."); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971) ("[S]tatutes [of
limitation] provide predictability by specifying a limit beyond which there is an ir-
rebuttable presumption that a defendant's right to a fair trial would be prejudiced.");
Gable v. Sweetheart Cup Co., 35 F.3d 851, 857 (4th Cir. 1994) ("Congress expressed
[an] 'emphatic preference for written agreements' in ERISA in order to establish pre-
dictability as to an employer's future obligations." (quoting Coleman v. Nationwide
Life Ins. Co., 969 F.2d 54, 58 (4th Cir. 1992))); American Tel. and Tel. Co. v. FCC,
836 F.2d 1386, 1394 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Starr, J., concurring) ("An examination of the
[Communications Act] as a whole makes crystal clear that the schedule filed by a
carrier serves as the foundation by which Congress' regulatory scheme achieves sta-
bility, predictability, and protection of the public interest."); see also John Fellas, Re-
constructing Law's Empire, 73 B.U. L. REV. 715, 763 (1993) ([C]lear statutes and
precedents secure predictability . . ."); Teresa Moran Schwartz, The Role of Federal
Safety Regulations in Products Liability Actions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1137 n.61
(1988) ("Courts and scholars also recognize that the use of statutory and regulatory
standards to define common-law liability can add clarity and predictability to the
tort system.").
63. See, e.g., Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740
(1989) ("'[Flederal statutes are generally intended to have uniform nationwide appli-
cation.'" (quoting Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 43
(1989))); North Carolina Dep't of Transp. v. Crest St. Community Council, Inc., 479
U.S. 6, 18 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Section 1988 is designed to 'achieve uni-
formity in those statutes and justice for all citizens.'" (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-
1558, at 9 (1976))); Grubbs v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 705 (1972)
("[The removal statutes and decisions of this Court are intended to have uniform
nationwide application.").
64. See infra text accompanying notes 120-29.
65. See infra text accompanying notes 89-119.
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II. EVIDENCE MYOPIA: THE FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE
FEDERAL RuLEs OF EVIDENCE ARE A PERPETUAL INDEX CODE
A. The Lesson from History: The Federal Rules of Evidence Are
a Perpetual Index Code
The title of this Article was inspired by an article written by
my colleague, Professor Paul Caron of the University of Cincin-
nati College of Law. In Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don't Let Your
Babies Grow Up to be Tax Lawyers, Professor Caron states:
"Until we start opening up the tax law to the light of nontax
insights, we cannot expect the public to treat us like our nontax
counterparts."66 Professor Caron convincingly argues that the
resolution of significant issues in the law of taxation would be
better served if the tax law community were informed by schol-
arship not directed exclusively to the audience of tax lawyers
and tax scholars.6" The message for tax scholars also should res-
onate with evidence scholars.68
Evidence myopia in the interpretation of the Federal Rules of
Evidence springs from identifiable sources: Contemporary evi-
dence scholars appear to be overly influenced by the literature
on the interpretation of legislative enactments that surrounds
them in an age of statutes; simultaneously, they have lost sight
of the literature that informed the culture and climate at the
time of the true origins of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Im-
pressive scholarship provides illumination from an historical
perspective that the Federal Rules of Evidence are the result of
a process that was designed to build upon the extant common
law.69 This codification of the common law has been aptly de-
66. Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be
Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 589 (1994).
67. See id.
68. Professor Caron's plea for eclecticism is echoed in Rosen, supra note 46, at
1247-48. Rosen predicts: "As law students' and practitioners' knowledge of evidence
law becomes increasingly identified with mastery of the Federal Rules of Evidence, it
becomes dangerously likely that evidentiary myopia will only advance." Id. at 1248.
69. See id. at 1137-60. A code may operate as the "culmination of the pre-code
materials," as seen in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. at 1176-77. Development of
this code "takes place in the hybrid soil of the Code and the pre-Code legal materi-
als." Id. at 1177. A code may comport to "breaki from pre-code archaic law" as in
the case of the Uniform Commercial Code. Id. at 1178. Under this form of code, the
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scribed by one commentator, Mark Rosen, as "the legislative pro-
nouncement of previously fluid judge-made law in an organized
and authoritative form."
70
Before examining the unique process surrounding the actual
development of the Federal Rules of Evidence, it may be helpful
to review briefly the distinctive characteristics of codes. Codifica-
tion is an ancient phenomenon that lacked a universal definition
and format until the Napoleonic French Code in the beginning of
the nineteenth century.7' The French Civil Code was the first
example of modern "true codification," a comprehensive and ex-
clusive set of rules governing one or several areas of the law.72
Although this method of codification became prevalent in Euro-
pean civil-law nations,7 3 it was not widely accepted in common-
law countries.7 4 Several leading proponents of codification in the
antecedent common law is not codified away, but retains a "not insubstantial legal
continuity" with the Code. Id.
70. Id. at 1127; see also Bruce Donald, Codification in Common Law Systems, 47
AUSTL. L.J. 160, 161 (1973) (describing codification in its most general sense as a
"systematic collection or formulation of law, reducing it from a disparate mass into
an accessible statement which is given legislative rather than mere judicial or aca-
demic authority").
71. See Jean Louis Bergel, Principal Features and Methods of Codification, 48 LA.
L. REV. 1073, 1074 (1988). Hammurabi's Code in Babylon and both the Sumerian
and Accadian Codes were compilations meant to supplement custom, not supersede
preexisting law. See id. at 1073. Roman law codes, such as the Gregorian Code,
Theodosian Code, and Justinian Code were composed of texts and doctrinal writings.
See id. Additionally, Russia and some Nordic countries had ancient codes. See id.
72. See id. at 1074; Donald, supra note 70, at 165; Wienczyslaw J. Wagner, Codi-
fication of Law in Europe and the Codification Movement in the Middle of the Nine-
teenth Century in the United States, 2 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 335, 340-41 (1953).
73. See Bergel, supra note 71, at 1075. Among the countries adopting the French
Civil Code's method of codification are Belgium, Luxemburg, Holland, Italy, Portugal,
Spain, Brazil, Argentina, Lebanon, and Germany. See id.
74. See id. at 1076. Jeremy Bentham was the primary proponent of codification in
the early nineteenth century. See Donald, supra note 70, at 164. In 1811, he even
went so far as to draft a comprehensive code for the United States in a letter to
President James Madison. See Jeremy Bentham, An Offer to Codify the Law of the
United States, reprinted in PAPERS RELATIVE TO CODIFICATION AND PUBLIC INSTRUCTION 1
(London, J. McCreery 1817). Although Bentham's efforts ultimately were rejected, lat-
er codification efforts by David Dudley Field did result in the adoption of civil codes
in California, North Dakota, South Dakota, Georgia, and Montana. See Bergel, supra
note 71, at 1076; Wagner, supra note 72, at 353-54. The eventual failure of many of
these Field Codes
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United States developed a species of code that was distinct from
codes advocated by their continental European counterparts.75
This historical development of the codes in the United States
has been described by one scholar in these words:
From the period following the Civil War and well into this
century the codification movement resulted mainly in the
enactment of statutes which were intended simply to compile
the common law. The codification process was understood as
a means of providing access to the prevailing wisdom, and
purging the common law of "impurities.""6
Consequently, in the United States, codes assumed an identity
that was distinguishable from continental models and that was
derived uniquely from this country's common law heritage.
Codification has historically fallen into certain identifiable
patterns,7 each of which has an identity and function quite dif-
highlights the immense difficulty of adopting this methodology in an al-
ready active common law system. A basic problem with the Field Civil
Code . . . was that it restated many existing principles in completely
new terminology which was extremely confusing, especially in light of the
idea that pre-existing law, where untouched, would continue to govern.
Donald, supra note 70, at 167-68.
75. The Story Commission submitted a report to the Governor of Massachusetts in
1837 in which it recommended that the law of evidence, along with other areas of
the law, be codified. See JOSEPH STORY ET AL., CODIFICATION OF THE COMMON LAW 25, 44
(New York, John Polhemus 1882). The Story Commission's approach to codification
was radically different from that advanced by Bentham. Under Story's approach, cod-
ification was simply a means of dealing with the growing common law. See GRANT
GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW, 26-27 (1977). The Commission stated that the
code was to be "interpreted and applied to future cases, as a Code of the common
law of Massachusetts .... It is to be deemed an affirmance of what the common
law now is . . . ." STORY ET AL., supra, at 44. The Commission's Report also noted
that the common law was to govern in situations not provided for by the code. See
id.
76. Ronald J. Allen, The Explanatory Value of Analyzing Codifications by Reference
to Organizing Principles Other Than Those Employed in the Codification, 79 NW. U.
L. REv. 1080, 1080 n.1 (citing GILMORE, supra note 75, at 69-73).
77. See Rosen, supra note 46, at 1200. Development of a codified area of law is
manifest in three code characteristics: the unique scope of each code, the arrange-
ment of each code's materials in accordance with a particular organizing scheme,
and the philosophical approach to the doctrinal field. See id. at 1200-01. According
to Rosen, the failure of scholars to recognize these characteristics of the codified law
has hindered the development of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See id. at 1213-16,
1241. First, the approach of evidence scholars in taking as a given the law that is
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ferent from that of a typical statute."8 Although there is no uni-
versal agreement on the nomenclature for the different types of
codes,7 9 scholars generally agree on the characteristics of the dif-
ferent types of codes.8" For the sake of convenience, this Article
adopts the nomenclature system refined by Rosen, which identi-
fies four types of codes: the fully comprehensive code;81 the field
comprehensive code;82 the meta-scheme model;83 and the per-
petual index model.' Historical evidence substantiates that
nearly all modern codifications in the United States belong to
the perpetual index model.85 Joseph Story described this model
as a "perpetual index to the known law, gradually refining, en-
larging and qualifying its doctrines, and, at the same time bring-
ing them together in a concise and positive form for public
use." 6 Under the perpetual index paradigm, a "code is a clari-
most determinative of their field of expertise has limited both the creativity and
scope of evidentiary principles. See id. at 1213. Second, the failure of scholars to rec-
ognize admissibility as the organizing principle of the Federal Rules of Evidence has
created confusion in properly interpreting the Rules. See id. at 1214-15. Finally, the
development of the Federal Rules of Evidence has been hindered by inattention to
adversarialism, the spirit of the Rules. See id. at 1241-44.
78. See id. at 1127 n.13.
79. See Bergel, supra note 71, at 1076-77 (identifying two types of codifica-
tion-substantive codification and formal codification); Donald, supra note 70, at 164
(identifying three forms of codes: the complete comprehensive code, the institutional
comprehensive code, and the partial comprehensive code); Rosen, supra note 46, at
1127 (identifying four forms of codes: the fully comprehensive code, the field com-
prehensive code, the meta-scheme model, and the perpetual index model).
80. Varieties of codes range from those that supersede all areas of preexisting law
to those that serve as an organizing tool for the preexisting law in a particular
area. See Bergel, supra note 71, at 1077, 1092; Donald, supra note 70, at 164-69;
Rosen, supra note 46, at 1127-37.
81. See Rosen, supra note 46, at 1127. The fully comprehensive code presupposes
that the whole body of private law is contained within the code, and its interpretive
focus is on the text of the code. See id. at 1127, 1129.
82. See id. at 1129. The field comprehensive code views itself as comprehensive
within its doctrinal field such that it is the exclusive source of law; however, it does
not purport to digest all of the private law. See id.
83. See id. at 1135. The meta-scheme model "asserts that the primary significance
of a code is that it organizes the legal materials, making 'a philosophically arranged
corpus juris possible.'" See id. (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Codes, and the Ar-
rangement of the Law, 5 AM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1870-71), reprinted in 44 HARv. L. REV.
725, 726 (1931)).
84. See id. at 1135, 1195-96.
85. See id.
86. STORY ET AL., supra note 75, at 46 (emphasis added).
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fying aid rather than a final statement"; it serves as "a vehicle
for facilitating the law's continued growth."87 Historically, this
type of codification was considered useful because it "facilitate[d]
access to the law without stifling the law's development.""8
The dynamics of the unique process of common law codifica-
tion in the United States have eluded contemporary evidence
scholars, 9 as well as the United States Supreme Court."° This
loss of perspective is somewhat surprising because impressive
historical evidence substantiates the conclusion that there are
only two federal codes: the Federal Rules of Evidence and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.9 At some point in time be-
tween the development of the predecessors of the Federal Rules
of Evidence-i.e., the Model Code and the Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence-and the proliferation of scholarship and judicial decisions
concerning the interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
evidence scholars and the Supreme Court appear to have lost
87. Rosen, supra note 46, at 1132; see SIR CARLETON KEMP ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAK-
ING 476 (7th ed. 1964) (defining a code as a restatement of the law that has the au-
thority of a statute); Bergel, supra note 71, at 1076 (arguing that codes in common
law systems "have as their main objective the identification and classification of pre-
existing rules").
88. Rosen, supra note 46, at 1132.
89. See supra notes 12-21 and accompanying text. At least one evidence scholar
mistakenly has described the Federal Rules as a self-contained civil law code. See
Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of Probative Value and Prejudice in Federal
Rule of Evidence 403: Can Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect the Common Law of Ev-
idence?, 41 VAND. L. REV. 879, 883 (1988). There is little question that a codification
of law can assume this form. See, e.g., FRANZ WIEACKER, A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW IN
EUROPE 371 (Tony Weir trans., 1995) (illustrating the German civil law code); Bergel,
supra note 71, at 1074 (noting a self-contained civil law code in the Napoleonic
Code); Donald, supra note 70, at 164 (discussing complete comprehensive codes);
Rosen, supra note 46, at 1176 (arguing that political factors gave rise to a civil law
code that governed to the exclusion of pre-Code law in France and Germany); Wag-
ner, supra note 72, at 342 (examining the historical background of the French Civil
Code). The historical evidence pertinent to the conception and adoption of the Feder-
al Rules, however, is overwhelmingly to the contrary. See David J. Langum,
Uncodified Federal Evidence Rules Applicable to Civil Trials, 19 WILLIAMETTE L. REV.
513, 531 (1983) ("Historically, almost the entire law in this field was judicially creat-
ed."); Rosen, supra note 46, at 1176-77; infra notes 120-65 and accompanying text.
Continental self-contained codes are in fact nonexistent at the federal level in this
country. See Rosen, supra note 46, at 1195-96.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 2-9.
91. See Rosen, supra note 46, at 1196 n.296.
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sight of the underpinnings of the codification movement in the
United States.92 This myopia is particularly remarkable because
the literature concerning codification is not obscure. The writing
of influential scholars such as Story, Pomeroy, and Llewellyn
during the latter half of the nineteenth century and the first
half of the twentieth century frequently addressed the universal-
ly understood principle that a code is subject to unique herme-
neutics because of its integral connection to, and derivation
from, the antecedent common law.9"
92. See supra note 89.
93. See STORY ET AL., supra note 75, at 44. Other scholars of great magnitude
shared Story's understanding of a perpetual index code. See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE
CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA § 47, at 67 (Paul Gewirtz ed. & Michael Ansaldi
trans., University of Chicago Press 1989) (1933); JOHN NORTON POMEROY, THE "CIVIL
CODE" IN CALIFORNIA (1885), microformed on 19th Century Legal Treatises, No. 788
(Research Publications); cf GILMORE, supra note 75, at 108-09 (noting the difficulties
of a formalistic approach to law in which judges are precluded from going beyond
the statute). John Norton Pomeroy, in a series of articles on the interpretation of
the California Civil Code, addressed the judiciary's role in the proper interpretation
of the Code. The courts were left the task of delineating the boundaries and defining
the meaning of the Code because the Code was not comprehensive. See POMEROY, su-
pra, at 45. A proper interpretation would construe the Code in a manner that would
retain the "distinguishing element of the common law, and one of its highest excel-
lencies . . . its elasticity." Id. at 52. The Code, according to Pomeroy, should be con-
strued as a "mere statement of the common law doctrines unchanged, with all its
consequences, unless from the unequivocal language of the provision a clear and cer-
tain intent appeared to alter the common law rule." Id. at 50. Rather than merely
stating the common law, though, Pomeroy argued that a code should contain a pro-
vision for adjustment so that an unjust or inequitable decision would not result from
blind adherence to the language of the code. See id. at 53. The codified common
law, then, was not static, but should possess "the inherent power of adaptation." Id.
Karl Llewellyn shared this prospective view of codification. According to Llewellyn,
the development of case law inevitably called for a statute, yet the statute was not
an end unto itself, but served as the starting point for future development. See
LLEWELLYN, supra, § 47, at 67 ("Optimally, a statute will create a new goal and a
new means to achieve it, but never the ultimate particularized solution which is fi-
nally achieved-knowingly or unknowingly, admitted or kept under wraps-only
through judicial decision."): Grant Gilmore discarded a formalistic approach to legal
interpretation, asserting that such an approach promotes the idea that courts, with-
out legislative approval, are constrained from judicial innovation. See GILMORE, supra
note 75, at 109. Gilmore asserted:
The function of law . . . is to provide a mechanism for the settlement of
disputes in the light of broadly conceived principles on whose soundness,
it must be assumed, there is a general consensus . . . [S]o long as the
consensus exists, the mechanism which the law provides is designed to
insure that our institutions adjust to change, which is inevitable, in a
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After overcoming myopia by drawing upon the work of schol-
ars who have carefully analyzed the various types of codes, it is
apparent that the Federal Rules of Evidence fit squarely in the
perpetual index category.9 4 Under this perpetual index model,
the code is not "construed... in derogation of the common law,"
but is "expanded in conscious reference to the antecedent com-
mon law."'5 The very same techniques used to expand the com-
mon law apply to the forward application of the code, unless the
code explicitly indicates that it is modifying specific provisions of
the extant common law.
96
Consequently, the code is construed and expanded in a man-
ner quite different from that applicable to statutes. The facial
qualities of the Federal Rules of Evidence convincingly demon-
strate that the Rules fit within the perpetual index model. Any
hermeneutical approach that would view the Rules as a whole-
sale displacement of the common law is manifestly inconsistent
with the structure of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In contrast
to the vast body of evidence law, the Federal Rules of Evidence
are, at best, skeletal." As pointed out by Professor Jon R. Waltz,
continuing process which will be orderly, gradual, and, to the extent that
such a thing is possible in human affairs, rational.
See id. at 109-10.
94. See Rosen, supra note 46, at 1195-96.
95. Id. at 1134; see also POMEROY, supra note 93, at 50 (offering a general prin-
ciple of interpretation that the common law should remain unchanged unless there
was a "clear and certain intent" to alter it); Bergel, supra note 71, at 1076 (noting
that in common law systems, interpretation of codes is "based on the pre-existing
law rather than on the proper legislative purpose that they express or the policy
that they reflect"); Wagner, supra note 72, at 358 (stating that although European
codes were not examined "in the light of the preexisting law ... the contrary hap-
pened" in the United States).
96. See Rosen, supra note 46, at 1135. Alternative hermeneutical approaches for
interpreting perpetual index codes include the view that the code displaces pre-code
common law. See id. Under this model, the code provides the platform on which fu-
ture growth is built. See id. Another variation is that the code, by virtue of its own
internal language, displaces the common law in regard to all matters that it ex-
pressly addresses. See id. Under this hermeneutical approach, the rule of decision is
furnished by the common law with respect to matters not expressly covered by the
code. See id.
97. See Margaret A. Berger, The Federal Rules of Evidence: Defining and Refining
the Goals of Codification, 12 HoFSTRA L. REv. 255, 255 (1984) (noting that the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence are not comprehensive, but rather set forth general principles
or standards); Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of
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Dean Wigmore's classic treatise on evidence included several
volumes; in comparison, the text of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence can be printed on a handful of pages.98 The Federal Rules
of Evidence simply cannot be understood without the benefit of
antecedent common law. One of the most indispensable roles of
the preexisting common law is to supply meaning to numerous
terms of art used throughout the Rules, and the Federal Rules
of Evidence would be dysfunctional in the absence of these defi-
nitions.99 For example, the entire hearsay system of Article VIII
would be incomprehensible were it not for the common law defi-
nitions of numerous terms, such as "truth," "statement," "utter-
ance," "intend," and "verbal."' °
Beyond the structure of the text of the Rules, the Advisory
Committee Notes demonstrate that the Rules are the culmina-
tion and index of antecedent common law. Whatever may be the
appropriate role of the Advisory Committee Notes in interpret-
ing the Federal Rules of Evidence,' a reading of the Notes re-
veals that they rely heavily upon antecedent common law.'0 2 In
Evidence, 74 IOWA L. REV. 413, 427 (1989) (referring to the Rules as a "handy pam-
phlet").
98. See Jon R. Waltz, Judicial Discretion in the Admission of Evidence Under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1097-98 (1984).
99. See Weissenberger, Are the Rules a Statute?, supra note 22, at 399. As I pre-
viously have written:
The day the Federal Rules of Evidence went into effect, the language of
the Rules was not lifeless, and courts were not befuddled by their appli-
cation. Indeed every trial judge had a sense of how to apply such unde-
fined words as "plain error" in Rule 103(d), 'condition of fact" in Rule
104(b), "adjudicative facts" in Rule 201(a), "probative value" in Rule 403,
"character" in Rule 404, "habit" in Rule 406, "competent" in Rule 601,
"assist" in Rule 702, "excitement" in Rule 803(2), and "impending" in
Rule 804(b)(2).
Id.
100. See Glen Weissenberger, Reconstructing the Definition of Hearsay, 57 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1525, 1541 (1996) ("[Rule 801] likewise relies upon the context of a long history
of common law development, without which the rule would be indecipherable.").
101. See Scallen, Use and Abuse, supra note 7, at 1296 ("Justice Kennedy [in Tome
v. United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995)] pointed out that the Advisory Committee drew
heavily upon the common law as portrayed in the work of Wigmore and
McCormick ... .
102. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note ("[Rule 403] does not
enumerate surprise as a ground for exclusion ... following Wigmore's view of the
common law."); FED. R. EVID. 602 advisory committee's note ("'TIhe rule requiring
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an effort to define the scope and meaning of the Rules, the Advi-
sory Committee Notes repeatedly refer to preexisting evidence
literature and preexisting case law.10 3 In this context, the late
Professor Edward Cleary wrote a well-known article that ad-
dressed the interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence.'°4
Discreet passages of Cleary's article are cited frequently by evi-
dence scholars as well as by courts in an effort to substantiate
the appropriate role of preexisting common law in the interpre-
tation of the Federal Rules of Evidence.0 5 Although different
scholars have found different messages in Professor Cleary's lan-
guage,' °6 his article suggests an integral and indispensable role
that a witness who testifies to a fact which can be perceived by the senses must
have had an opportunity to observe, and must have actually observed the fact' is a
'most pervasive manifestation' of the common law. . . .") (quoting CHARLES T.
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 19 (1954)); FED. R. EVID. 901(b) advi-
sory committee's note ("The treatment of authentication and identification draws
largely upon the experience embodied in the common law ....").
103. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee's note (noting that the advisory
committee's discussion of adjudicative and legislative facts "draws extensively upon
[the] writings" of Professor Kenneth Davis); FED. R. EVID. 402 advisory committee's
note (quoting JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE
COMMON LAW 264 (1898)); FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note (citing Paul
D. Rheingold, The Basis of Medical Testimony, 15 VAND. L. REV. 473, 489 (1962));
FED. R. EVID. 706 advisory committee's note (citing Elwood S. Levy, Impartial Medi-
cal Testimony-Revisited, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 416 (1961)); FED. R. EViD. 1008 advisory
committee's note (citing A. Leo Levin, Authentication and Content of Writings, 10
RUTGERS L. REV. 632, 644 (1956)).
104. See generally Cleary, supra note 29 (arguing that the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence are applied by means of judicial interpretation).
105. See, e.g., Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 168 (1995) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (reiterating Daubert's reliance on Cleary's position); Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587-88 (1993) (recognizing previous references by the
Court to Cleary's article); Bouijaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 187 (1987)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting Cleary's article to reject the majority's reliance on
the "plain meaning" of the rule); United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 51-52 (1984)
(citing Cleary's article to support the notion that one could impeach a witness on
the basis of bias because such impeachment is consistent with common law princi-
ples); Imwinkelried, supra note 7, at 394 (quoting Cleary in support of the strength
of the Advisory Committee Notes).
106. Compare Weissenberger, Interpretation of the Rules, supra note 22, at 1330-31
("[Tihe preservation or engraftment of additional evidentiary doctrines and principles
was ... specifically contemplated as integral to the structural scheme of the
Rules . . . Professor Cleary . . . stated: '[in reality . . . the body of common law
knowledge [of evidence] continues to exist, though in the somewhat altered form of a
source of guidance . .. .'" (quoting Cleary, supra note 29, at 915)), with
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for the preexisting common law: "In principle, under the Federal
Rules no common law of evidence remains.... In reality, of
course, the body of common law knowledge continues to exist,
though in the somewhat altered form of a source of guidance in
the exercise of delegated powers."'07 The simple fact is that the
Federal Rules of Evidence would be incomprehensible to anyone
who did not understand the broad common-law landscape of evi-
dence law that preceded the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Many, if not most, Rules only make sense if they are
construed in the context of the common law they codify,0 8 and
the Advisory Committee Notes document this proposition by
demonstrating a conscious awareness of the indispensable role of
the preexisting common law."0 9 The compression of evidence law
into a brief code would not have been possible without the vitali-
ty of the underlying and preexisting common law that continues
to animate the Rules in their application."
Although historical evidence concerning the codification move-
ment in the United States provides the greatest insight into the
identity of the Federal Rules of Evidence as a perpetual index
code, Rule 102, "Purpose and Construction,""' further reinforces
this conclusion. Provisions like Rule 102 are not only a common
denominator of virtually all perpetual index codes;1 2 they also
are critical to understanding the function and interpretation of
Imwinkelried, supra note 24, at 287-88 ("Professor Cleary.. . noted an early post-
Rules case applying the clear and convincing evidence standard under Rule
404(b) . . . [and] condemned the case as unjustifiably 'engrafting a further require.
ment' onto the text of the statute." (quoting Cleary, supra note 29, at 917)).
107. Cleary, supra note 29, at 915.
108. For example, Rule 613 is only comprehensible as changing the common law if
the preexisting common law is understood. See GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE 321 (1996-97 ed.) ("he prior practice in some Federal Courts was to follow
the rule established in Queen Caroline's case.... Rule 613, however, dispenses with
the Queen's Rule in favor of a procedure which is designed to enhance the effective
use of cross-examination.").
109. See Rosen, supra note 46, at 1131-35, 1161, 1187-96.
110. See id. at 1171-72.
111. FED. R. EviD. 102.
112. See Rosen, supra note 46, at 1179-86; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (providing the
scope and purpose of the.rules); FED. R. EVID. 102 (noting the purpose and construc-
tion of the rules); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-102 (illustrating the rules of construction).
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the code." Typically, if a code is intended to allow judicially-led
expansion and development of codified law, a "purpose" provi-
sion will stipulate that intention."4 Accordingly, Rule 102 ex-
pressly invites, if not commands, such judicial activism."' In
this context, the express and literal language of Rule 102 is di-
rect and clear: "These rules shall be construed to secure fairness
in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and de-
lay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evi-
dence to the end that truth may be ascertained and proceedings
justly determined."116 Understanding the literal import of Rule
102 must be extremely elusive, because evidence scholars who
have studied the Federal Rules of Evidence have manifested a
chronic proclivity to avoid this Rule."' When considered with the
benefit of an historical perspective that appreciates the process
of the codification of the common law in the United States, how-
ever, Rule 102 is clearly unique among all of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. As is typically the case in codes, the "Purpose and
Construction" rule, Rule 102, is the only rule in the Federal
Rules of Evidence that contains an express mandate."' This
mandate of Rule 102 must be applied literally, and if it is, the
remainder of the Rules will not be interpreted as typical stat-
utes. Interestingly, logical and deductive reasoning commands
this result. Either Rule 102 is to be taken literally in such a way
that the express text of the various Rules does not operate as an
impasse to the mandated growth and development of evidence
113. See Rosen, supra note 46, at 1179-86 (discussing code provisions permitting
equitable adjustments to vary the code's strict rules).
114. See id. at 1253; see also Bruce W. Frier, Interpreting Codes, 89 MICH. L. REV.
2201, 2202 (1991) (describing "general clauses" as vague provisions that allow for ju-
dicial discretion and appear in all European civil codes).
115. See Rosen, supra note 46, at 1189; cf. Moore, supra note 28, at 1095 (deter-
mining that in the context of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "[riequiring the
Court to apply a Rule rigidly without permitting the Court to consider the policies
behind the Rule would deprive the litigants of a fair and just result in their case,
thereby violating the central goal of the Rules expressed in Rule 1.").
116. FED R. EviD. 102.
117. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
118. See Rosen, supra note 46, at 1195 (The Federal Rules of Evidence must be
seen for what they are-a codification of the common law. Rule 102 is that Code's
mechanism . . . for avoiding the dangers of ossification and ensuring that evidence
law can continue to evolve.").
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law, or the remaining Rules of Evidence must be perceived as
literal, statutory mandates and Rule 102 is meaningless. Clear-
ly, Rule 102, as fundamental as it is, cannot be treated as frivo-
lous."1
Consequently, the structure of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
the Advisory Committee Notes, and Rule 102 each reinforce the
conclusion that the Rules are a perpetual index code. As further
confirmation of this conclusion, this Article next examines the
events surrounding the conception and adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.
B. Codification and the Developmental History of the Federal
Rules of Evidence
With the benefit of historical perspective, the Federal Rules of
Evidence readily can be seen as the product of the continuing
codification movement in the United States. The Federal Rules
of Evidence were conceived in the judicial branch in 1961 when
Chief Justice Earl Warren appointed a Special Committee on
Evidence to study the desirability and feasibility of a uniform
code of evidence for federal courts that would unify existing
evidence doctrines.120 It is noteworthy that the original task was
identified as one that would unify, but not recast, evidentiary
doctrine.'12 In response to the affirmative recommendation of the
Special Committee's 1963 Final Report, Chief Justice Warren
appointed an Advisory Committee in 1965 to draft the Federal
Rules of Evidence.2 Three drafts of the Rules were published
and circulated for comment before they were submitted to Con-
gress.123
119. See supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
120. The Judicial Conference created a Committee on Rules of Practice and Proce-
dure. See 1958 JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S. ANN. REP. 15. After the subject of evidence
rules was referred to this committee, the committee decided a special group should
be convened to address the question. In 1961, the Judicial Conference approved a
study to determine the advisability and feasibility of uniform rules for federal courts.
Chief Justice Warren then appointed a special committee on evidence. See Prelimi-
nary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and
Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 175-77 (1969) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft].
121. See Preliminary Draft, supra note 120, at 177-78.
122. See id. at 177-79.
123. The proposed Rules drafted by the Advisory Committee were approved by the
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Unlike prior procedural rules, however, when the Supreme
Court promulgated the Federal Rules of Evidence on November
20, 1972, questions were raised concerning the Court's authority
to prescribe certain specific rules."M The Rules were promulgat-
ed pursuant to congressional enabling authority that granted
the Supreme Court the power to prescribe Rules governing the
practice and procedure of the federal courts, provided that such
Rules did not "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right."125 Critics closely scrutinized several of the rules promul-
gated by the Supreme Court in an effort to determine whether
the Supreme Court had exceeded its authority under the En-
abling Act by prescribing certain rules that might be outside the
scope of "practice and procedure."126 The debate over whether the
Supreme Court had exceeded its power became moot, however,
when Congress intervened with legislation stipulating that the
Federal Rules of Evidence would not take effect until they were
approved expressly by Congress. 7 Consequently, Congress in-
tervened in the process to facilitate the adoption of the Rules by
eliminating an issue that might have served as an obstacle to
the realization of the Rules. Although Congress did revise the
standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and then by the Judicial
Conference as a whole. See id. at 173. Copies of the Rules and accompanying Advi-
sory Committee Notes were circulated among the bench and bar for comments. See
Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magis-
trates, 51 F.R.D. 315, 316 (1971). After the Rules were submitted to the United
States Supreme Court, they were sent back to the Committee for further consider-
ation. With more comments, the Committee made some changes and then sent the
revised Rules back to the Supreme Court. The Court then transmitted the Rules to
Congress. See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D.
183, 184 (1973) [hereinafter Rules].
124. See Rules, supra note 123, at 185 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also S. REP.
No. 93-1277, at 6 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.AN. 7051, 7053 (noting criti-
cisms of the promulgation process); H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 3-4 (1973), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.CN. 7075, 7077 (noting Justice Douglas's dissent).
125. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994).
126. See Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of
Fed. Crim. Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 142-58 (1973) (tes-
timony and statement of Hon. Arthur J. Goldberg, retired Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States) (testifying that the proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence affected substantive rights and, therefore, surpassed the scope of the Rules
Enabling Act).
127. See Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9.
1568
EVIDENCE MYOPIA
Supreme Court's version of the Rules in specific isolated provi-
sions, 8 it did not reconstruct the design of the Rules, nor did it
change the character of the Rules as a unification of preexisting
evidence law. Rather, Congress's modifications were limited to
the revision of the text of certain discrete provisions of the
Rules, and the vast majority of the Supreme Court's version of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, as well as the integrity of the
structure and identity of the Rules as a code, were left intact by
Congress when the Rules became effective on January 3, 1975.129
Although Congress played an indispensable role in the process
that led to the enactment of the Federal Rules, the structural
design and textual balance of the Rules originated in the judicial
branch.13 1 Consequently, it is important to examine the crafting
of the Rules within the judicial branch to appreciate their identi-
ty as a unifying codification of preexisting law. At the judicial
conference, Chief Justice Warren charged the Special Committee
on Evidence-with the approval of the judicial conference-with
considering the advisability and feasibility of rules to govern
evidence uniformly in all federal courts.3 1 Upon an affirmative
response to the report of the Special Committee, Chief Justice
Warren appointed the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of
Evidence to draft the actual text of the Rules.3 2 The Advisory
Committee commenced its task not by rethinking and revolu-
tionizing the law of evidence, but by drawing upon the frame-
work of the Model Code of Evidence and the Uniform Rules of
Evidence.3 3 In fact, when the Advisory Committee transmitted
its first draft to the Supreme Court, the Committee specifically
acknowledged "its indebtedness to its predecessors [the Model
Code and the Uniform Rules] in the field of drafting Rules of
evidence.""3
128. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 93-1597, at 1-8 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7098, 7099-7106.
129. See supra text accompanying note 26.
130. See supra text accompanying note 120.
131. See A Preliminary Report on the Advisability and Feasibility of Developing
Uniform Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts, 30 F.R.D. 73, 75
(1962).
132. See id. at 113; Preliminary Draft, supra note 120, at 173.
133. See Michael S. Ariens, The Law of Evidence and the Idea of Progress, 25 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 853, 863 (1992),
134. Preliminary Draft, supra note 120, at 180.
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By modeling the text of the Federal Rules after the Model
Code and the Uniform Rules, the Advisory Committee embraced
what can be placed in historical context as a codification of exist-
ing principles and not a statutory displacement of preexisting
evidentiary doctrines. In fact, Professor Edmund Morgan, who
had written the preface to the Model Code in 1956, advocated a
generalized approach to codification that would allow for judicial
discretion in the application of the Rules.135 Opposing this ap-
proach, Dean Wigmore advocated a particularized statute that
detailed the specific application of each of the rules.13 After an
extensive debate concerning the underlying philosophies of tex-
tual design, the framers of the Model Code conclusively rejected
Wigmore's approach.'37 In the foreword to the Model Code, Pro-
fessor Morgan indicated that the framers specifically chose to
create a "Code." 138 Explaining the framers' resolution, Professor
Morgan pointed out that the framers could have followed three
distinct courses in drafting the Model Code:
Anyone attempting to frame the necessary provisions to these
ends has several courses open. The first is to canvass all the
situations in which pertinent questions have been answered
by the courts and to devise a mandate to the trial judge for
each such case.... Another course is to frame a very few,
very broad general principles, and direct the trial judge to
apply them.... The third method is to draw a series of rules
in general terms covering the larger divisions and subdivi-
sions of the subject without attempting to frame rules of
thumb for specific situations and to make the trial judge's
rulings reviewable for abuse of discretion.... In short,...
the choice is between a catalogue, a creed, and a Code. The
Institute decided in favor of a Code. 3 9
Clearly, Professor Morgan believed that the audience of his re-
marks would attach a common understanding, undoubtedly de-
135. See Edmund M. Morgan, Foreword to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 1, 13-15 (1942);
Ariens, supra note 133, at 859.
136. See Ariens, supra note 133, at 860.
137. See Morgan, supra note 135, at 12-13.
138. See id. at 13.
139. Id. at 12-13.
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rived from history, to the use of the term "Code." The term ap-
pears to be carefully chosen for its intended connotation. In fact,
Professor Morgan capitalized the word "Code" in an apparent
effort to emphasize its use in a specially meaningful way.140 Al-
though there is no indication that a similar debate occurred in
the context of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the drafters of the
Federal Rules of Evidence were well aware of Professor Mor-
gan's comments when they chose to model the Rules directly
after its predecessor codes." The lack of such a debate suggests
that the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence acquiesced to
the identity of the Rules as a codification of law and not a de-
tailed displacement.
A distinctly instructive episode in the development of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence involves the congressional amendment of
certain provisions of the Rules.'42 In regard to these isolated
amendments, I have previously written:
Where Congress chose to alter the Supreme Court's version of
a particular rule, the modification inescapably represents
substantial legislative intervention, such that the result is a
provision of the Rules that can appropriately be treated in
accordance with statutory construction principles.... Never-
theless, the recognition that certain isolated provisions of the
Federal Rules of Evidence have, a statutory identity high-
lights the necessity of a fine-tuned approach to interpreting
the Federal Rules of Evidence, and Congress' specific alter-
ation of certain Rules underscores the reality that the majori-
ty of the text of the Federal Rules of Evidence originated in
the judicial branch of government. 143
With the benefit of an historical perspective of the identity and
nature of codes, Congress's amendments actually may be subject
to two alternate, equally defensible analyses. On one hand, con-
struing certain portions of the Rules that were amended by Con-
gress as a statute is defensible because Congress sought to exer-
140. See id.
141. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
142. See H.R. CoNF. REP. NO. 93-1597, at 1-8 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7098, 7099-7106.
143. Weissenberger, Interpretation of the Rules, supra note 22, at 1320-21.
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cise its legislative prerogative in these extremely limited in-
stances.1' On the other hand, with the benefit of historical in-
sight, it is equally, if not more, defensible to argue that Con-
gress was merely fine-tuning a code that was delivered to it by
the judicial branch. Under this analysis, the congressional
amendments are no more statutory than the rules that Congress
left intact. Regardless of which analysis one embraces, it is most
important to appreciate that Congress did not reformulate the
entire structure of the code, nor did it in any way revise Rule
102-the Rule that defines the ethos of the code.145
Recognizing Congress's actions as amendments to a codifica-
tion of preexisting law places in proper perspective the few pro-
visions of the Rules that appear incongruous with the identity of
the Federal Rules of Evidence as such a code. For example, Pro-
fessor Imwinkelried has criticized my position that federal
courts continue to possess the power to create uncodified evi-
dence doctrines by superimposing or engrafting such doctrines
onto the language of the Federal Rules of Evidence.' In doing
so, Professor Imwinkelried has focused on the presence of Rule
501, which "specifically authorizes the courts to continue to
evolve privilege doctrine by 'common law' process." 47 Professor
Imwinkelried has stated: "Professor Weissenberger's position
144. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 609(a); FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). For a discussion of Rule
609, see Weissenberger, Interpretation of the Rules, supra note 22, at 1312-13. For a
discussion of Rule 804(b)(1), see United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317 (1992); Glen
Weissenberger, The Former Testimony Hearsay Exception: A Study in Rulemaking,
Judicial Revisionism, and the Separation of Powers, 67 N.C. L. REV. 295, 312-36
(1989).
145. See Weissenberger, Interpretation of the Rules, supra note 22, at 1320-21. As I
explained in that article,
[Congress's] modifications were limited to the revision of the specific text
of discreet provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the vast ma-
jority of the Supreme Court's version of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
as well as the integrity of the structure of the Rules, were left intact by
Congress when the Rules became effective on January 2, 1975.
Id. at 1320; see also Moore, supra note 28, at 1060 ("It should also be noted that
the recent actions of Congress interjecting itself in the rulemaking process have pri-
marily involved discrete procedural issues rather than issues that have a significant
substantive effect.").
146. See Imwinkelried, supra note 24, at 272.
147. Id. at 277 (quoting FED. R. EvID. 501).
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would reduce Rule 501 to a meaningless nullity. Rule 501 would
be unnecessary if, as Professor Weissenberger asserts, the courts
retain a general common law power to create 'evidentiary doc-
trines'; the provision purports to confer on them a power he as-
serts they already have." Rule 501, which preserves the com-
mon law powers of federal courts in regard to the law of privi-
leges, originated in Congress to replace an extensive constella-
tion of rules promulgated by the Advisory Committee.149 Con-
gress substituted Rule 501 for the Advisory Committee's rules to
preserve the status quo, rather than to modify the law of priv-
ileges.15 Rule 501 therefore was not a product of the original de-
sign of the Rules. Rather, it was added as the result of a polit-
ically driven process in which Congress sought to make the
Rules more palatable in order to attain their ultimate adop-
tion.15" ' This accident of political compromise should not be seen,
as Professor Imwinkelried suggests, as a demonstration that
rules outside of Article V preclude the continued growth and
expansion of evidentiary law. 52 Viewed with an historical per-
spective, Rule 501 is an anomalous product of political necessity
and not the product of the overall design.
When examined in historical context, the development of the
Federal Rules of Evidence emerges as a part of the codification
movement in the United States that sought to make the increas-
148. Id. (footnotes omitted).
149. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 8 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C-.AN. 7075,
7082 ("Article V as submitted to Congress contained thirteen Rules.... The Com-
mittee amended Article V to eliminate all of the Court's specific Rules on privileg-
es."). See generally Glen Weissenberger, The Psychotherapist Privilege and the Su-
preme Court's Misplaced Reliance on State Legislatures, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 999 (1999).
150. See H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 8 ("[Ihe Committee, through a single Rule, 501,
left the law of privileges in its present state . ").
151. See S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 6 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051,
7053. The report states:
Since it was clear that no agreement was likely to be possible as to the
content of specific privilege rules, and since the inability to agree threat-
ened to forestall or prevent passage of an entire rules package, the deter-
mination was made that the specific privilege rules proposed by the
Court should be eliminated and a single rule ([R]ule 501) substituted ....
Id.
152. See Imwinkelried, supra note 24, at 276-79.
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ing complexity of the common law more accessible." Dominated
by the judiciary, it was a process designed to unify, not to dis-
place, the preexisting law of evidence."54 How can so many schol-
ars and the Supreme Court fail to recognize that the Federal
Rules possess a unique identity as the codification and continua-
tion of the common law? Beyond a simple myopic disregard of
history, there may be some other explanatory theories that un-
derlie this phenomenon:
1. Admittedly, the idea that only one rule (i.e., Rule 102) in a
constellation of rules is to be taken mandatorily and literally is
somewhat elusive. An awareness of the historical context of the
codification of American law, however, yields a proper under-
standing of the unique role of Rule 102 and what it expressly
commands. The mental gyrations involved in taking literal com-
mands from one rule but not others is best understood with the
benefit of this historical perspective. 5'
2. Ultimately, Congress has the dominant authority in the
rulemaking process,'56 and some scholarship appears to be dis-
tracted by this basic principle. 57 This authority, however, should
not be confused with actual historical occurrence. Congress in
fact collaborated with the Supreme Court in the creation of a
codification of the preexisting common law.
3. The rulemaking process that produced the Federal Rules of
Evidence concluded with a legislative act.' Consequently, schol-
ars and courts leap carelessly to the conclusion that the Federal
Rules of Evidence are a typical statute. Not all legislation, how-
ever, results in statutes.'59 As history illuminates, some legisla-
153. See supra notes 69-96 and accompanying text.
154. See id.; supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 111-19.
156. See Moore, supra note 28, at 1041-53.
157. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
158. See President Gerald R. Ford, Statement on Signing a Bill Establishing Rules
of Evidence in Federal Court Proceedings, 1 PUB. PAPERS 6 (Jan. 3, 1975) (signing
bill into law).
159. See Rosen, supra note 46, at 1138-40 (explaining the types and interpretations
of authoritative legal texts including statutes, constitutions, and codes); Wagner, su-




tion results in codes that have unique identities.160 With the
benefit of a historical perspective and a proper appreciation of
the express language of Rule 102, it becomes much easier to un-
derstand that Congress, in promulgating the Federal Rules of
Evidence, participated in the creation of a perpetual index code.
This affirmation requires a bit of mental gymnastics because, in
effect, Congress was saying that it "intended" a code, and yet no
legislative intent lies behind the individual rules, except for Rule
102.161
4. A final reason why the appropriate ethos of the Federal
Rules of Evidence has eluded many scholars, as well as the Su-
preme Court, is that codes are encountered infrequently in fed-
eral law. In this respect, Rosen's insight is particularly percep-
tive: "It is not surprising that the Supreme Court has not been
sensitive to the code-quality of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The Court has only limited occasion to deal with codes, for most
codes are codifications of state law."162 In fact, some state evi-
dence codes have been adopted through a process that does not
involve the participation of the legislature.'63 Frequently, when
state legislatures are involved in the adoption process, their role
is wholly passive."
160. See supra text accompanying notes 77-84.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 45-51.
162. Rosen, supra note 46, at 1196 n.296.
163. The two most recent states to adopt the Federal Rules of Evidence, Pennsylva-
nia and Alabama, have done so without any legislative involvement whatsoever. See
Pa. R. Evid. § 101(b) Pennsylvania, PA Order 98-16 (1998); Charles W. Gamble,
Drafting, Adopting and Interpreting the New Alabama Rules of Evidence: A Reporters
Perspective, 47 ALA. L. REV. 1, 1-5 (1995). Prior to the codification of their law of ev-
idence, both Pennsylvania and Alabama followed common law evidentiary rules that
served as the guiding principle in the adoption of the Rules of Evidence. See Pa. R.
Evid., preface (West 1998); Charles W. Gamble & Frank S. James III, Perspectives
on the Evidence Law of Alabama: A Decade of Evolution, 1977-1987, 40 ALA. L. REV.
95, 112-13 (1988). The Alabama Rules were even revised to reflect more explicitly
preexisting Alabama common law. See Gamble, supra, at 3, app. at 27-71 (detailing
objections to proposed rules and the Advisory Committee's response, and indicating
that rules were changed in response to objections).
164. See Walker J. Blakey, A Short Introduction to the Ohio Rules of Evidence, 10
CAP. U. L. REv. 237, 242 (1980). Subsequent amendments to the Ohio Rules of Evi-
dence also have been enacted through the passive inaction of the Ohio legislature,
allowing the evolution of the common law of evidence to be reflected in the Ohio
Rules of Evidence. For example, the Ohio Supreme Court Advisory Committee drafted
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Whatever the reasons behind this evidence myopia, the conse-
quences are disturbing and damaging. The United States Su-
preme Court's impairment of vision is particularly unfortunate,
because it ultimately could mean a stagnation in the growth of
evidence law and an abdication in deference to an intent that
does not exist either metaphorically or in reality.165
Up to this point, this Article has endeavored to convince the
reader that statutory interpretation principles are ill-suited for
interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence because of the unique
identity of the Rules as a perpetual index code. If at all im-
pressed with these arguments, the reader may well ask: What
then is the function of the text of the Federal Rules of Evidence?
The remainder of the Article addresses this issue.
III. INTERPRETATIONAL LESSONS TO BE DERIVED FROM THE
CONCLUSION THAT THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE ARE
A PERPETUAL INDEX CODE
A. Examination of Professors Scallen and Taslitz's Approach to
Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence
In their discussion of the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, Professors Scallen and Taslitz
point out that critics of the Supreme Court's predominately
textualist approach have failed to offer an alternative approach
to interpreting the Rules. 166 In this respect, Professors Scallen
and Taslitz are correct. Most critics of the Supreme Court's ap-
proach to interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence have ar-
an expanded version of the text of Rule 702 to reflect a series of decisions of the
Ohio Supreme Court, and the passive inaction of the Ohio General Assembly led to
that version's adoption. See OHIO R. EVID. 702 staff note (1994).
165. See Rosen, supra note 46, at 1196. As Rosen notes:
And to the extent the Supreme Court's interpretive dictum.. . could
mean that the Federal Rules of Evidence should be construed as an ordi-
nary statute with respect to growth of the law, such an approach to the
Federal Rules of Evidence evinces a misunderstanding that threatens to
undermine the very code protection sculpted to allow continued legal
growth.
Id.
166. See Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, supra note 7, at 1719; Taslitz, Politically Real-
istic Hermeneutics, supra note 7, at 354, 355-56 & n.112.
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gued that the approach is wrong-minded but have failed to pres-
ent an alternative approach. 167 In fact, a comprehensive ap-
proach to interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence was not
advanced until the contributions of Professors Scallen and
Taslitz. 168 Unfortunately, both Professor Scallen and Professor
Taslitz start from the wrong place. In developing interpretation
schemes that purportedly are more desirable and more coherent
than the Supreme Court's prevailing texualist approach, Profes-
sors Scallen and Taslitz assume that the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence are a statute.169 As previously illustrated, and as will be
the subject of further elaboration, this premise is an unfounded
and ill-suited point of departure for developing a system for
construing the Federal Rules of Evidence. Consequently, regard-
less of how carefully Professor Scallen and Taslitz construct
their interpretive schemes, they are congenitally flawed.
On a side note, although the largely overlapping interpretive
approaches of Professors Scallen and Taslitz might be intellectu-
ally defensible if the Federal Rules of Evidence were indeed a
statute, both approaches suffer from an inescapable density that
precludes their effective application at the spark point of litiga-
tion in the trial courtroom.170 The experience of most trial law-
167. See, e.g., Jonakait, supra note 56, 782-86.
168. Professor Taslitz's hermeneutic approach focuses on the interaction between
the author of a rule and its reader, whereas Professor Scallen's practical reasoning
approach emphasizes the process through which a reader of a rule argues for a
specific interpretation to his or her audience. See Scallen & Taslitz, supra note 10,
at 435. Both approaches, however, require the reader to resort to extrinsic sources
in order to interpret the purpose of a rule properly. See id. at 435-36.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
170. See Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, supra note 7, at 1750. Scallen notes that in a
difficult case
the judge's rationale will become "part of a dialogue or conversation
among the individuals participating in a practical endeavor. For some
period of time, the techniques of practical reason will lead different par-
ticipants to incompatible conclusions. As to issues of this sort, practical
reason will not yield a definitive answer because there is a lack of con-
sensus. If the issue is particularly intractable, consensus might take
years or even generations to develop. In the meantime, since action can-
not be suspended, participants in the dialogue will act upon their individ-
ual practical judgments."
Id. (quoting Michael L. Seigel, A Pragmatic Critique of Modern Evidence Scholarship,
88 NW. U. L. REV. 995, 1029 (1994)); see also Taslitz, Politically Realistic Hermeneu-
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yers will support the conclusion that the courtroom is no place
for Taslitzian hermeneutics or Scallenian practical reasoning. 171
Even when applied at the appellate level, the interpretational
schemes of Professors Scallen and Taslitz inevitably involve a
complex calculus of weighing extrinsic and textual sources that
appears to be so indeterminate that there really is no system at
all.172 Still, the most fatal defect of the analyses of Professors
tics, supra note 7, at 394-95. Taslitz states:
[Hiermeneutics teaches us that text cannot be given meaning until it is
interpreted, for the interpreter must often choose among competing mean-
ings and inevitably draws on his own experience. The choices of the in-
terpreter, the judge, will be controlled by no single value.... [It then]
becomes appropriate to inquire into the historical setting, particularly the
legislative history. Where that is inadequate, one should try imaginative
reconstruction, and where that fails, purpose is the next best guide. Pur-
pose itself is flexible, however, since it can be described at varying levels
of generality, purposes may conflict, and new problems may arise that
the Congress did not anticipate. This, in turn, requires consideration of
evolutive concerns ... . This reliance on multiple sources of evidence
reflects the pragmatic view that decision-making is best and most con-
vincing when we examine the consistency of the evidence for each value
of importance to us before reaching a decision.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
171. The time to argue an objection is simply not sufficient, as the vast degree of
study necessary to present comprehensive arguments on the basis of extrinsic mate-
rials would thwart the timely resolution of legal claims.
172. The hermeneutic approach, as explained by Professor Taslitz, denies a single,
objectively valid interpretation of a body of text, thereby allowing the reader to
choose among competing interpretations. See Taslitz, Politically Realistic Hermeneu-
tics, supra note 7, at 353-54. The choice among competing interpretations is "politi-
cally realistic" in that recognizing particular statutory interpretations reflects political
values, thus requiring a theory of politics concerning "how the legislature works,
whether it works well, and what is and should be its relationship to the courts." Id.
at 354. A hierarchy of sources determines the correct approach to statutory inter-
pretation. See id. at 394-95. The text of the statute is the most important source be-
cause it represents a formal enactment of law. See id. at 394. In descending order of
importance, the remaining sources of utilization in statutory interpretation are his-
torical considerations, imaginative reconstruction, and purpose. See id. at 394-95.
Like politically realistic hermeneutics, Professor Scallen's practical reasoning ap-
proach also eschews the application of a single method of interpretation in all cir-
cumstances. See Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, supra note 7, at 1748. At the trial court
level, a court using practical reasoning usually will be limited to the text or legisla-
tive history in interpreting a rule, as discussion beyond these sources would affect a
trial's timely resolution adversely. See id. at 1753. An appellate court applying prac-
tical reasoning, however, will have a greater obligation to look beyond the text of
the rule, thereby allowing for the most thorough and persuasive interpretation. See
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Scallen and Taslitz is that they both perceive the Rules as con-
taining language that stands for underlying meaning,' when in
reality the language of the Rules serves an entirely different
purpose.'74 Consequently, Professors Scallen and Taslitz's well-
meaning but wrong-minded quest to reach a "justifiable con-
struction of the rule" 5 by weighing all sources of interpretation
is destined to fail from the very start. To see a rule as the result
of a process that works its way to some underlying meaning is to
misperceive the function of a rule in a perpetual index code. The
discussion below demonstrates the proper approach to the inter-
pretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence as an index to the
preexisting common law.
B. Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence as a Perpetual
Index Code
Rules in a perpetual index code, such as the Federal Rules of
Evidence, are best understood as markers, or indices, of prog-
ress. As noted above, these rules constitute "a perpetual index to
the known law, gradually refining, enlarging and qualifying its
doctrines, and, at the same time, bringing them together in a
concise and positive form for public use."76 No "intent" lies be-
hind a rule in such a code. 77 The language in an evidence code
id. at 1754. In choosing among different interpretations of a rule, a court applying
practical reasoning will look to extrinsic sources to aid its determination. See
Scallen, Use and Abuse, supra note 7, at 1301: These sources include the language
of the rule, language of related texts, intentions of the drafters, historical context of
the rule, past textual interpretations, instrumental aspects of potential interpreta-
tions, and the evolution of the text over time. See id.
173. See, e.g., Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, supra note 7, at 1751-52 (describing the
different types of sources necessary to determine properly the meaning behind the
text of a rule); Scallen & Taslitz, supra note 10, at 441 (explaining the proper ap-
proach to determine the meaning behind the text of the Rules); Taslitz, Politically
Realistic Hermeneutics, supra note 7, at 394 (arguing that hermeneutics teaches us
that text cannot be given meaning until it is interpreted).
174. See supra text accompanying notes 48-50.
175. Scallen & Taslitz, supra note 10, at 430.
176. STORY ET AL., supra note 75, at 46.
177. See Rosen, supra note 46, at 1177; supra text accompanying notes 50-51; see
also Bergel, supra note 71, at 1076 (stating that in common law countries "[tihe as-
sumption is that the legislator simply meant to reformulate rules drawn from the ju-
risprudence"); Donald, supra note 70, at 169 ("The methodology of partial codification
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may be seen metaphorically as the common vocabulary spoken
by lawyers and judges in trial and appellate courtrooms and in
their attendant memoranda and briefs. Accordingly, the rules in
the Federal Rules of Evidence should not be construed by at-
tempting to discern their intended underlying meaning. Rather,
they must be interpreted in the context of the fluid common-law
doctrines that the Rules represent.1 8 Furthermore, if the man-
date of Rule 102 is to be taken seriously, one must accept the
notion that the text of the Rules represents one point in the con-
tinuum of the development of evidence law.'79 This continuum
reflects the substantial development of the common law prior to
the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence and subsequent to
which the same repertoire of techniques employed to foster the,
enlightened growth and development of evidence law must be
used.
Nothing in the foregoing should be construed to suggest that
the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence left the common
law totally unchanged. Unquestionably, one of the benefits of
codification is the opportunity to alter common-law doctrines
that have proven to be unworkable or unfair.8 ° In the same way
that a court may change judicial precedent, a perpetual index
code can alter the common law. 8' A perpetual index code is,
nevertheless, but a marker of that change. Most importantly,
consistent with the mandate of Rule 102, the position of the law
at the time of the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence is
not paralyzed.
To a generation of statutory thinkers, the above analysis may
seem preposterously unworkable.' 2 After all, one may easily
is basically to restate, in a detailed form, the pre-existing law in particular areas.").
178. See supra text accompanying notes 89-96, 103-10.
179. See Rosen, supra note 46, at 1189.
180. See id. at 1177 ("Sometimes, it is true, [codification] requires alteration of a
'bad' common law rule.").
181. See id. at 1137 & nn.56-58. In fact, the Federal Rules of Evidence were devel-
oped in the hope of "unifying" the law of evidence in federal courts. See supra text
accompanying notes 120-21. This unifying process inevitably created changes.
182. See, e.g., GILMORE, supra note 75, at 97 ("[In] cases in which even the most
disingenuous construction will not save the day ... it has always been as-
sumed .. .a court must bow to the legislative command, however absurd, however
unjust, however wicked.").
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hypothesize severe adverse consequences when the law of evi-
dence is allowed to grow judicially beyond the point of the mark-
er or index captured by the language of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Although this may be a problem for those who think
in statutory terms, the problem is hardly novel from an histori-
cal perspective. In fact, one of the earliest arguments against
codifying the common law was that codification would deprive
judges of the necessary discretion to do justice in particular cas-
es.1" However, "[tihe hollowness of this argument is patent:
there is no reason why codes could not incorporate provisions
granting judges the discretion to make equitable adjustments
where,.necessary."'4 Rule 102, which by its very nature trumps
all other Rules, specifically grants this discretion by declaring
that the Federal Rules of Evidence must be construed "to secure
fairness in administration.""8 5 Accordingly, the express text of a
rule can be disregarded in a particular case, i.e., "in administra-
tion," when fairness will be "secured."8 6 In fact, Professor Robert
183. See F.H. Lawson, A Common Law Lawyer Looks at Codification, 2 INTER-Am.
L. REV. 1, 4 (1960); Carl McFarland, Administrative Law and Codification of Stat-
utes, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD: CENTENARY ESSAYS 204, 206 (Alison Reppy ed., 1949);
Rosen, supra note 46, at 1123 & n.4; Wagner, supra note 72, at 348.
184. Rosen, supra note 46, at 1179; see also WIEACKER, supra note 89, at 377 (de-
fining general clauses in the German Code as "guidelines in the form of maxims ad-
dressed to the judge, designed both to control and to liberate him"); Frier, supra
note 114, at 2202-05 (examining French and German "general clauses" that allow for
judicial discretion in the application of laws); Wagner, supra note 72, at 350-51 (dis-
cussing judicial discretion in the context of complex civil codes).
185. FED. R. EVED. 102.
186. Although the Supreme Court has never placed -its imprimatur on this ap-
proach, other courts have cited Rule 102 as the basis for disregarding the express
text of an evidence rule in particular cases. See United States v. Panzardi-Lespier,
918 F.2d 313, 317-18 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that although the government failed to
comply with the formal notice requirement of Rule 804(b)(5), "allowing the jury to
hear the dead informant's testimony before the grand jury is in harmony with both
the interest of justice and the general purposes of the Rules of Evidence"); Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 723 F.2d 238, 288 (3d Cir. 1983) (affirm-
ing the trial court's decision to admit records despite the absence of supporting testi-
mony by a qualified witness or custodian as required by Rule 803(6) on the basis
that the trial court's ruling was "consistent with the spirit of the Rules"), rev'd, 475
U.S. 574 (1986); United States v. Batts, 558 F.2d 513, 517 (9th Cir. 1977) (conclud-
ing that the trial court's deviation from the requirements of Rule 608(b) was proper
in that "the rules of evidence should not be lost by a rigid, blind application of a
single rule of evidence"), withdrawn and affd on other grounds, 573 F.2d 599 (9th
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW IzVIEW [Vol. 40:1539
Summers has argued that section 1-103 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code should be interpreted in a similar manner.187 Under
his approach, the common law equitable principles embodied in
section 1-103 would be available not only to fill in gaps created
by code silence, but also to create exceptions to code provi-
sions. 8 Accordingly, in the evolution of a code over time, when a
number of cases reflect a collective disregard for a particular
rule, that rule becomes ripe for amendment.1 8 9 In this circum-
stance, a new marker or index may be necessary to preserve the
progress and growth of evidence law, and the rulemaking pro-
cess should be triggered to initiate the creation of an amend-
ment. To statutory thinkers, this approach undoubtedly appears
radical. If Rule 102 is to be taken seriously, however, the law
must be permitted to grow, and this growth inevitably occurs
within the judicial branch on a case-by-case basis. 90
The foregoing analysis should not be construed as an argu-
ment that federal courts have unbridled discretion to disregard
the text of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Courts did not have
limitless discretion to disregard the federal common law of evi-
dence prior to the adoption of the Rules.19' On a case-specific
basis, however, a court is justified in departing from the literal
text of a rule of evidence when fairness, growth, and justifiable
efficiency require it. 9 2 Moreover, a court of appeals should af-
Cir. 1978); see also Rosen, supra note 46, at 1185-86 (discussing situations in which
equitable adjustments are permissible to vary the code's strict rules).
187. See Robert S. Summers, General Equitable Principles Under Section 1-103 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 906, 908-10 (1978).
188. See id.
189. See Rosen, supra note 46, at 1196.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 112-16.
191. See Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 381-83 (1933). In Funk, the Court
deviated from the common-law rule that a wife was not competent to testify as a
witness on behalf of her husband. See id. at 381-82. The common law, according to
the Court, "is not immutable but flexible, and by its own principles adapts itself to
varying conditions." Id. at 383. The Court concluded that it, and other federal
courts, "by right of their own powers, may decline to enforce the ancient rule of the
common law." Id. at 382.
192. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 102; United States v. Panzardi-Lespier, 918 F.2d 313,
317-18 (1st Cir. 1990); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 723 F.2d
238, 288 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 475 U.S. 574 (1986); United States v. Batts, 558 F.2d
513, 517 (9th Cir. 1977), withdrawn and affd on other grounds, 573 F.2d 599 (9th
1582
EVIDENCE MYOPIA
firm a trial court decision disregarding a particular rule when
the mandate of Rule 102 warrants such a result.9 3 Courts only
effectively change the law on a case-by-case, fact-specific basis.
Consequently, only when several cases have justifiably disre-
garded the text of a particular rule of evidence does a signal for
possible reevaluation and amendment of the rule emerge. In
fact, specific Federal Rules of Evidence that have undergone
amendment have reflected a process not unlike the one de-
scribed here."9
Accordingly, the appropriate hermeneutical approach for in-
terpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence becomes better focused
when one understands the dynamism of the growth of the com-
mon law. Fundamentally, as a perpetual index code, the Federal
Rules of Evidence bring together and make useful the body of
law that preceded their adoption.'95 Likewise, the Federal Rules
of Evidence represent an index of the best thinking that could be
brought to bear on the issues of evidence law at the time of the
Rules' adoption. 9 ' To use the common-law paradigm, the Feder-
al Rules of Evidence are the strongest precedent for the issues
they address. Still, the Federal Rules of Evidence, other than
Rule 102, do not reflect the intent of any entity, legislative or
judicial. Thinking about the Federal Rules of Evidence in terms
of intent introduces an analysis that anthropomorphizes the
Rules beyond their appropriate function. In this context, the
Advisory Committee Notes are extremely useful in understand-
Cir. 1978).
193. See Rosen, supra note 46, at 1185 (discussing the use of Rule 102 as a source
for "equitable deviation"). For examples of courts disregarding the express text of a
Federal Rule of Evidence to achieve equitable results, see Panzardi-Lespier, 918 F.2d
at 317-18; Zenith Radio Corp., 723 F.2d at 288; Batts, 558 F.2d at 517.
194. See Becker & Orenstein, supra note 7, at 866-67. According to Becker and
Orenstein, the amendment of Rule 609 resulted "in part from the [Supreme] Court's
criticism [in Green v. Bock Laundry Mach., Inc., 490 U.S. 504 (1989)] of the irra-
tionality of the old version." Id. at 867 n.46. Becker and Orenstein discuss the split
among the circuits over whether Rule 407 applies in products liability actions. See
id. at 893-94. A recent amendment to Rule 407 reflects the position of the majority
of circuit courts, and provides that evidence of subsequent measures "is not admissi-
ble to prove . . . a defect in a product, a defect in a product's design, or a need for
a warning or instruction." FED. R. EVID. 407.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 85-88.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 101-10.
1999] 1583
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1539
ing the thinking, but not the intent, that operated in the selec-
tion of the specific language used in a rule.19 Accordingly, the
text of a rule of evidence can only be understood, and then ap-
plied, with the aid of context derived from the preexisting com-
mon law, regardless of whether the rule restated or altered the
common law.198 Most significantly, the dynamic process of the
growth of the common law informs the process for interpreting
the Federal Rules of Evidence, whereas principles borrowed from
interpreting statutes do not.1 99
C. Illustrations of the Application of the Perpetual Index Code
Model
This Article does not seek to explain the essence of the dyna-
mism of the common law. Perhaps, under a Llewellian analysis,
understanding that dynamism is an endless process. °0 The fol-
lowing, however, are some brief analyses, drawn from cases and
other scholarly commentary, that illustrate the way in which the
Federal Rules of Evidence, as a perpetual index code, appropri-
ately should operate.
In a frequently cited article, Professor Thomas Mengler ob-
serves that the Federal Rules of Evidence incorporate discretion
by virtue of certain ambiguities contained within the Rules.01
According to Mengler, flexibility was built into the Federal Rules
in diverse ways.0 2 Among other devices, the text of some of the
Rules incorporated a certain degree of vagueness.0° Rule 406,
for example, provides for the admissibility of habit evidence, but
nowhere in the Rule is the term "habit" defined.2° Moreover, as
Professor Mengler points out, not only does the Advisory Com-
mittee Note fail to resolve the issue, it actually compounds the
197. See supra text accompanying notes 101-03.
198. See id.
199. See Rosen, supra note 46, at 1134 ("[The Code] is to be understood and ex-
panded in conscious reference to the antecedent common law and by means of the
repertoire of common law interpretive techniques ... ."); supra note 93.
200. See generally KARL N. LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH (1991).
201. See Mengler, supra note 97, at 426.
202. See id. at 426-27, 438.
203. See id. at 440.
204. See FED. R. EviD. 406; Mengler, supra note 97, at 416.
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ambiguity by rendering two different theories concerning the
nature of conduct that constitutes a "habit," one that is narrow
and one that is broad.0 5 According to Mengler, this ambiguity
grants trial courts significant leeway in deciding whether to ad-
mit evidence under Rule 406.206 By deciding whether to apply a
limited or comprehensive definition of the term "habit," trial
courts ultimately may determine the admissibility of evidence in
a specific case.20 7 Professor Mengler's analysis of Rule 406 pro-
vides the basis for an illustration as to the proper function of an
evidence code, with his identification of the vagueness in Rule
406 as a point of departure.0 8
Although one may lapse easily into the inflexible vocabulary
used by statutory thinkers concerning the "design" or "intent" of
the rule, a better understanding of the proper hermeneutics for
interpreting Rule 406 results from simply recognizing the ab-
sence of a definition within the rule itself. Without a clear defi-
nition in the rule, any court applying Rule 406 would recognize
immediately that it must make a choice as to a definition.0 9
Several courts making these choices over time create a body of
precedent. Ultimately, in the same manner as the common law
develops, a particular understanding of the term "habit" may
emerge as the prevailing definition. Thus, at some point in time,
Rule 406 may be ripe for amendment to reflect the prevailing
view, or it may be amended to reset the course by rejecting the
prevailing position and embracing an alternate definition.21 If
the amendment process were activated and an amendment actu-
ally adopted, courts thereafter still would have a choice, but the
choice would be different. A court would have the option to fol-
low the strong precedent presented by the definition expressly
contained in Rule 406 or, if that definition would produce an un-
fair, unjust, or inefficient result in a particular case, the court
would have the option to use its discretion to disregard the text
205. See Mengler, supra note 97, at 417-18.
206. See id. at 424.
207. See id.
208. See id. at 416-25.
209. See id. at 424.
210. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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of the Rule in accordance with the express mandate of Rule
102.11 Before long, the process would begin anew. Courts would
sort through fact-specific cases and develop the law of habit evi-
dence on a case-by-case basis. Periodically, the marker or index
might change, but the process would remain the same.
Although Rule 406 is hardly a lightning rod for evidentiary
debate with attendant significant social implications, Professor
Mengler, in his 1989 article, does foreshadow Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ,212 a 1993 landmark case that un-
questionably has had a meaningful impact on the role of litiga-
tion in society. 13 In his article, Professor Mengler describes the
flexibility that is apparent in the text of Rule 702.214 Simulta-
neously, Professor Mengler notes that the "general acceptance
test" for scientific expert testimony under Frye v. United
States215 was the common law standard at the time the Federal
Rules of Evidence were adopted.216 Neither Rule 702 nor the Ad-
visory Committee Note, however, mentions the Frye test.21 7 Al-
though statutory thinkers might seize upon this silence as a
demonstration of the "intent" of the drafters to reject the Frye
test, one hardly must think in terms of intent in order to recog-
nize that Rule 702 permits a court to make a choice whether to
apply the Frye general acceptance test or some other test.218 The
211. See supra text accompanying notes 111-19.
212. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
213. See, e.g., David L. Faigman, Mapping the Labyrinth of Scientific Evidence, 46
HASTINGS L.J. 555 (1995); David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the
Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worry-
ing About the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799 (1994); Edward
J. Imwinkelried, Evidence Law Visits Jurassic Park: The Far-Reaching Implication of
the Daubert Court's Recognition of the Uncertainty of the Scientific Enterprise, 81 IO-
WA L. REV. 55 (1995); Adina Schwartz, A 'Dogma of Empiricism" Revisited: Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the Need to Resurrect the Philosophical In-
sight of Frye v. United States, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 149 (1997); Laurens Walker &
John Monahan, Daubert and the Reference Manual: An Essay on the Future of Sci-
ence in Law, 82 VA. L. REV. 837 (1996).
214. See Mengler, supra note 97, at 447-49.
215. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
216. See Mengler, supra note 97, at 448. Under Frye, an expert opinion based on
scientific knowledge is admissible only when the technique is "generally accepted" in
the relevant scientific community. See Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
217. See FED. R. EVID. 702; Mengler, supra note 97, at 448.
218. See Mengler, supra note 97, at 449. Mengler notes that Rule 702:
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Rule, in providing this choice, must be viewed in the context of
the prevailing Frye general acceptance test. The simple histori-
cal fact is that Rule 702 could have embraced the prevailing
common-law rule, and it did not. Likewise, it could have rejected
the prevailing common-law rule, and it did not. Given the dy-
namic process of common-law development, the message in Rule
702 at the time of the adoption of the Rules was that the law
needed further evolution before the marker specifically should
determine whether to embrace or reject the Frye test. As Profes-
sor Mengler quite correctly points out, the Rule gives courts the
opportunity to make a choice based upon policy considerations.
Of course, in the well-known Daubert case, the United States
Supreme Court, interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence as a
statutory enactment using a textualist approach, somewhat sim-
plistically reasoned that because the Frye test was not expressly
preserved in language on the face of Rule 702, there was an in-
tent by somebody or some entity to reject the Frye test. 19 Given
the Rules-as-statute premise of the Supreme Court, the Court
employed logic derived from the law pertaining to statutory con-
struction and concluded that if the Frye test were to be pre-
served, the plain language of the Rule would have referred ex-
pressly to that standard.22 ° This approach inappropriately defers
to legislative supremacy and abdicates the Court's responsibility
to employ the values identified in Rule 102 in expanding the law
of evidence. The appropriate hermeneutics in the Daubert case
would have been to make a choice as a court would make such a
marks some clear parameters for trial courts: for expert testimony to be
permitted, the expert must be able to inject some information into the
trial proceeding that would be useful to untrained jurors. But Rule 702
also provides a trial court with the discretion to demand more of novel
scientific evidence-that it meet Frye's general acceptance test.
Id.
219. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588-89. In Daubert,
the Court noted that "[niothing in the text of [Rule 702] establishes 'general accep-
tance' as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility." Id. at 588. The Court found the
assertion that the Rules assimilated the Frye standard "unconvincing" because Rule
702 did not specifically mention "general acceptance." Id. at 589. The Court thus
concluded that the Frye standard, "absent from, and incompatible with, the Federal
Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials." Id.
220. See id. at 588-89.
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choice in the forward evolution of the common law. In other
words, the Court should have selected the test based on the val-
ues articulated in Rule 102 rather than looking for some legisla-
tive command. None of this is to say that the Court should have
adopted the Frye test. Perhaps the test should have been dis-
carded based upon the wisdom derived from the evolution of the
law on a fact-specific, case-by-case basis. It nevertheless would
be a mistake to reason that the Frye standard was legislated
away by virtue of the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Such reasoning plainly ignores the perpetual index quality of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, in which the Rules operate as mark-
ers of the growth of the law rather than a displacement of the
preexisting law.22'
Beyond Daubert, the Supreme Court's hermeneutics in inter-
preting the Federal Rules of Evidence may be questioned seri-
ously in virtually any of the cases in which it construed a rule of
evidence as a statutory enactment."22 One of the more interest-
ing analyses appeared in Tome v. United States,22 in which the
Court construed Rule 801(d)(1)(B). This Rule provides that a
prior statement of a witness is not hearsay if the out-of-court
declarant testifies as a witness, is subject to cross-examination
at the trial, and the statement is "consistent with the declarant's
testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge
against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence
or motive."2  Defendant Tome stood trial on charges that he sex-
ually abused his daughter.2 5 In his defense, Tome argued that
the child's mother concocted the allegations in an effort to obtain
221. See supra text accompanying notes 168-84.
222. See supra note 5.
223. 513 U.S. 150 (1995).
224. FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(1)(B). For further discussion, see 2 MCCORMICK ON EVI-
DENCE § 251 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992); JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET
A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 801.12 (2d ed. 1998); WEISSENBERGER, supra
note 108, at §§ 801.13, 801.15.
225. See Tome, 513 U.S. at 152-53. For in-depth treatment of prior statements, see,
for example, Frank W. Bullock, Jr. & Steven Gardner, Prior Consistent Statements
and the Premotive Rule, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 509 (1997); Scallen, Classical Rheto-
ric, supra note 7; Scallen, Use and Abuse, supra note 7; Taslitz, Politically Realistic
Hermeneutics, supra note 7.
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custody.226 The issue the case ultimately presented to the Su-
preme Court was whether a declarant's prior consistent state-
ments were subject to a "premotive requirement."227 The
premotive requirement was a part of the common law of evi-
dence, and it provided that prior consistent statements used to
bolster credibility and offered to rebut a charge of recent fabrica-
tion must have been made before the motive to fabricate
arose.221 In Tome, the trial court admitted the evidence, and the
Tenth Circuit affirmed, noting that the text of the Rule did not
mention the premotive requirement.2 29 The Tenth Circuit an-
nounced a test in which a declarant's motive to lie, the circum-
stances under which the statement was made, and the declar-
ant's tendency to lie are weighed against one another to deter-
mine whether the statement should be admissible..2 " The United
States Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the balancing test of
the Tenth Circuit.23' Instead, the Court found that the Rule's
language, in its limitations and similarities to the pre-Rule com-
mon law, suggested that Congress intended the Rule to codify
and retain the premotive requirement of the antecedent common
law.2 3
2
In some respects, the Court's analysis comes close to a herme-
neutics that recognizes the Federal Rules of Evidence as a per-
petual index code. The Court did examine and ascertain the an-
tecedent common law.233 Moreover, the Court closely examined
the textual language of the Rule and compared it with the com-
mon law. 34 The Court also looked to the Advisory Committee
Note for guidance as to whether the Rule is consistent or incon-
sistent with the prevailing common law at the time of the adop-
226. See Tome, 513 U.S. at 153.
227. See id. at 152.
228. See id. at 156.
229. See United States v. Tome, 3 F.3d 342, 350 (10th Cir. 1993), reuvd, 513 U.S.
150 (1995) ("Although the text of the rule is silent on this point, some circuits re-
quire that the declarant's prior consistent statement precede the time that the al-
leged motive to lie arose.").
230. See Tome, 513 U.S. at 155.
231. See id. at 164-65.
232. See id. at 160.
233. See id. at 156.
234. See id. at 156-57, 159-60.
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tion of the Federal Rules of Evidence.235 Most interestingly, in
addition to the meaning derived from the text of the Rule, the
Supreme Court found support for rejecting the Tenth Circuit's
balancing test in the fact that "the somewhat peculiar language
of the Rule bears close similarity to the language used in many
of the common-law cases that describe the premotive require-
ment." 6 The Court nevertheless failed to alloy these elements
properly. By comparing the text of the Rule with the common
law tradition, the Court found confirmation for its conclusion
that the drafters intended the Rule to retain the premotive re-
quirement.2 37 The problem with the Court's analysis is that it
anthropomorphizes the process behind the Rule by looking for
intent, rather than perceiving the Rule as an index or a marker.
In this context, the Court abdicated its role of deciding which of
the potential interpretations of the Rule would best serve the
adversary process and the values articulated in Rule 102. By
construing the Rule as a statute, the Court deferred to legisla-
tive supremacy when such deference was misplaced.238
By way of comparative illustration, if the Supreme Court had
recognized the Federal Rules of Evidence as a perpetual index
code, the Court, behaving as it would under the common law
tradition, would have examined which construction of the Rule
best suited the articulated purposes of the evidentiary system.
If, hypothetically, the Court had decided that the Tenth Circuit's
balancing test was the best way to advance the purposes of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, the Court then would have deter-
mined whether that approach could coexist with the express text
of Rule 801(d)(1)(B)." 9 If the Court had found compatibility be-
tween the balancing test and the text of the Rule, the test would
235. See id. at 160-63.
236. Id. at 159.
237. See id. at 159-60.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 25-34; see also Weissenberger, Interpreta-
tion of the Rules, supra note 22, at 1323-24 (discussing why the legislative intent
doctrine has a limited role in the interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
239. After all, it is defensible to assume that the balancing test is compatible with
the text because a panel of the Tenth Circuit had concluded that its balancing test
was not palpably incompatible with the express language of the rule. See United
States v. Tome, 3 F.3d 342, 350, rev'd, 514 U.S. 150 (1995).
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have been engrafted on the Rule by common-law growth of the
legal principles indexed by the Rule. If, however, the Court had
decided that the Tenth Circuit's balancing test best advanced
the purposes of the Rules, but could not reconcile such a test
with the text of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), it nevertheless could have
affirmed the Tenth Circuit based upon the language of Rule
102.240 In essence, the Court would have concluded that, under
the facts specifically presented by the Tome litigation, a balanc-
ing test was justified "to secure fairness in administration" un-
der the values expressly articulated in Rule 102, i.e., efficiency,
justice, and truth.241 If the Court had decided the issue in this
fashion, the decision would have become part of the landscape of
the law of evidence, and it would have been factored into the
decision at some point in time as to whether Rule 801(d)(1)(B)
should be amended in order to better serve as a marker of evi-
dence law.242 Of course, if the United States Supreme Court had
considered the Tenth Circuit's balancing test to be the most ef-
fective method of advancing the purposes of the Rules in the
context of the specific facts of Tome, and it simultaneously had
found that the balancing test was incompatible with the text of
Rule 801(d)(1)(B), the Court simply could have employed one of
the repertoire of techniques used to avoid a decision.24
Finally, one must remember that, given the rulemaking pro-
cess of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Supreme Court has
the prerogative to initiate changes in the text of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.2 4 Accordingly, in the dynamic process of ad-
240. See supra text accompanying notes 184-86.
241. FED. R. EVID. 102; see supra text accompanying notes 184-86.
242. See supra text accompanying note 162.
243. Although this Article tries to avoid myopia, it simultaneously recognizes the
enormity of the issue of when it is appropriate for the highest court either to accept
or decline to decide a particular issue. See, e.g., Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing
Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV. 603 (1992); Gene R.
Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CmH. L. REV. 153 (1987); Girardeau
A. Spann, Simple Justice, 73 GEO. L.J. 1041 (1985).
244. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2074 (1994). The Rules Enabling Act authorizes the Su-
preme Court to propose changes in rules of practice and procedure, including the
Federal Rules of Evidence. See id. § 2072. The Judicial Conference, which actually
drafts and amends the Rules, consummates the proposed changes. See id. § 2073. To
aid the performance of these responsibilities, the Judicial Conference is, in turn, di-
vided into several standing committees, as well as various Advisory Committees. See
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vancing the growth of the law, the Supreme Court not only has
the opportunity to balance many values and considerations in
decisions on a case-by-case basis; it also has the opportunity to
initiate amendments in the code that reflect growth that emerg-
es through the dynamics of the forward application of the com-
mon law process.
CONCLUSION
A number of commentators have pointed out that strict
textualism in the interpretation and construction of the Federal
Rules of Evidence inevitably will result in the ossification of the
law of evidence, such that its vitality will be paralyzed.245 Like-
wise, other evidence commentators have focused on Rule 102 as
a rule that at least facially appears to be incompatible with a
textualist approach to the Federal Rules of EvidenceY' This Ar-
ticle has endeavored to make a unique contribution to the litera-
ture concerning the proper interpretation of the Federal Rules of
Evidence by bringing historical illumination to the nature of the
Rules as a perpetual index code. Simultaneously, this Article
has sought to introduce a hermeneutics that reconciles the codi-
fication of the Federal Rules of Evidence with the mandate of
Rule 102, a rule that commands that the Rules be construed to
secure the promotion of growth and development of the law of
evidence.
Without the benefit of an historical perspective as to the func-
tion of a perpetual index code, it is extremely difficult to under-
stand the way to reconcile a static text and dynamism in the
id. Upon completion of the final draft of the proposed changes in the Rules, the Ju-
dicial Conference transmits its recommendations to the United States Supreme
Court. Upon an affirmative review of the changes, the Supreme Court, which pos-
sesses the ultimate responsibility for proposing and facilitating changes in the Feder-
al Rules of Evidence, transmits the proposed changes to Congress for its approval.
See id. §§ 2071-2074. For a comprehensive discussion concerning the process of ef-
fecting changes in the rules of practice and procedure, see A Self-Study of Federal
Judicial Rulemaking: A Report from the Subcommittee on Long Range Planning to
the Committee on Rules of Practice, Procedure and Evidence of the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States, 168 F.R.D. 679 (1995).
245. See supra text accompanying notes 52-57.
246. See Mengler, supra note 97, at 438-39; Rosen, supra note 46, at 1189-93.
1592
19991 EVIDENCE MYOPIA 1593
law. The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that we live
in an age of statutes, and that, consequently, when we encoun-
ter a legislative enactment, it is difficult to resist viewing the
enactment through a statutory lens. With the benefit of histori-
cal light, we can see more clearly that the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence are a codification of, and a continuation of, the preexisting
common law.
